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ABSTRACT 
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the California law 
proscribing the sale of violent video games to minors violated the First 
Amendment and was, therefore, unconstitutional.  Because this is the first video 
game case to be heard by the Supreme Court, the decision marked a significant 
milestone for the video game and entertainment industries.  The beginning of this 
note will review the history leading up to the passage of the law as well as examine 
previous attempts by other states to regulate the distribution of violent video games 
to minors.  Most importantly, this note will explore the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association including the Court’s analysis of 
the applicable constitutional law.  Lastly, this note will examine the California 
law’s potential impact on the video game industry had it been deemed 
constitutional.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A man holding a gasoline can stands in the middle of a mall.  Suddenly, he 
begins pouring the contents of the can onto the floor and onto people waiting 
patiently in line to meet a celebrity.  Then, the man lights a match and throws it 
onto the trail of gasoline igniting the blaze.  People begin to burst into flames as 
screams and cries of pain erupt.  The man who started it all, then pulls out a gun 
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and takes aim at the flame engulfed figures that have become scattered around the 
mall.  He then proceeds to use the flaming bodies as target practice.  After the 
flames have burned out, the villain leaves the mall, walking over the charred 
corpses.  He makes his way to a church, where he proceeds to the confessional and 
his voice echoes, “Bless me father for I have really sinned . . . .”  At this time, he 
pulls out his gun and begins firing shots at the priest through the partition.1  
The Supreme Court has ruled that the video game described above cannot be 
proscribed from minors despite its violent content.2  While the imagery may be 
disturbing, it is just one of the many scenarios that play out in the video game, 
Postal 2.3  The Supreme Court’s holding rendered such interactive violence as 
fully protected by the First Amendment, and more importantly, that it is 
unconstitutional to prohibit the sale of these types of violent video games to 
minors.4  
In 2005, California passed legislation intended to prevent such games from 
being distributed to minors.5  Postal 2, however, is the only video game that was 
clearly identified as banned under California’s statute.6  Although California has 
been permanently enjoined from enforcing the law since 2005,7 the State 
successfully appealed the case all the way to the United States Supreme Court in 
2010.8  In its most recent term, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments from both 
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1 BonersGames, Postal 2 – Share the Pain – Tuesday [2/2], YOUTUBE.COM (Aug. 16, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nmA_LmAy7mY&feature=related.  
2 Brown v. Entm’t. Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  
3 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 
(9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1448). 
4 Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2729.  
5 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§1746–1746.5 (West 2005).  
6 In California’s brief on petition for certiorari, the State reports other scenes of violence 
demonstrated in Postal 2.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 46–47, Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (No. 
08-1448).  Specifically, the game features scenes of:  
[T]orturing images of young girls, setting them on fire, and bashing their brains 
out with a shovel, for no reason other than to accumulate more points in the 
game.  In one scene . . . the player . . . looks through a scope on an assault rifle 
and sees a very realistic image of a person’s face.  The player then shoots the 
victim in the kneecap.  As the player watches the victim attempt to crawl away, 
moaning in pain, the player pours gasoline on the victim and lights him on fire.  
As the burning victim continues to crawl, the player urinates on the victim, and 
says “That’s the ticket.”  After noting that it “smells like chicken,” the player 
again looks at the victim through the scope on the gun, and again sees a realistic 
human face, on fire, crawling toward him.  The player then shoots the victim in 
the face, which turns into charred remnants of a human image.  In another scene, 
the player hits a woman in the face with a shovel, causing blood to gush from her 
face.  As she cries out and kneels down, the player hits her twice more with the 
shovel, this time decapitating her.  The player then proceeds to hit the headless 
corpse several more times, each time propelling the headless corpse through the 
air while it continues to bleed.  
Id. 
7 See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
8 Gregory Boyd, Video Game Regulation and the Supreme Court: Schwarzenegger v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association, GAMASUTRA 1 (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.gamasutra.com/view/ 
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the State of California and the Entertainment Merchants Association and rendered 
its decision on June 27, 2011.9  This is the first video game case to be heard by the 
United States Supreme Court.10  It is the goal of this note to explore the recent 
opinion issued by the Supreme Court as well as examine the potential impact on 
the video game industry if the law had been deemed constitutional.  In Part II, this 
note reviews the history of governmental concern with portrayals of violence being 
viewed by minors.  Part II also explains the video game ratings system and the 
video game industry’s policy of self regulation.  Part III summarizes the relevant 
constitutional law including the obscenity standard and the protections of the First 
Amendment.  Part IV explores and analyzes previous attempts by other states to 
regulate the distribution of violent video games to minors.  Part V summarizes the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision leading up to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.  
Next, Part VI details the Supreme Court’s decision and analysis including the 
concurring and dissenting opinions.  Although, the Supreme Court ultimately 
affirmed California’s law as unconstitutional, Part VII explores the potential 
affects such a law would have on the video game industry.  And finally, Part VIII 
is a brief conclusion commenting on society’s concern with violent media.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  History of Government Involvement and Industry Self-Regulation 
Public and political concern with portrayals of violence in the entertainment 
industry is nothing new.11  Beginning in the 1990s, a number of studies and special 
interest groups began to emerge espousing the potentially damaging long-term 
effects of young people viewing violent media.12  This specific concern with 
children viewing violence only gained momentum throughout the 1990s during 
which time there were a number of widely publicized incidents of teens reenacting 
violence they had previously witnessed,13 ultimately culminating with the 1999 
                                                          
feature/6191/video_game_regulation_and_the_.php.  
9 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 
(2010) (No. 08-1448); Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729. 
10 See Stephen Totilo, All You Need to Know About This Week’s Violent Video Game Case in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, GIZMODO (Nov. 1, 2010), http://kotaku.com/5678354/all-you-need-to-know-
about-this-weeks-violent-video-game-case-in-the-us-supreme-court.  
11 Thomas A. Hemphill, Self-regulation, public issue management and marketing practices in the 
Entertainment Industry, 3 J. PUB. AFF. 338, 338–57 (2003), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ 
doi/10.1002/pa.162/pdf; FTC Releases Report on the Marketing of Violent Entertainment to Children, 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Sept.11, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/youthviol.shtm.   
12 See Hemphill, supra note 11, at 339. 
13 See Tara Kole, Advertising Entertainment: Can Government Regulate Advertising, 9 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2002).  In 1995, Sarah Edmonson and her boyfriend, Benjamin Darrus, 
inspired by the film Natural Born Killers, went on a cross-country crime spree during which they 
paralyzed one victim and murdered another.  Id.  In 1997, a high school freshmen went on a rampage, 
shooting teachers and students at his school after viewing the movie, The Basketball Diaries.  Id.  In 
1996 in Moses Lake, WA, Barry Loukaitis began shooting teachers and classmates during his algebra 
class and ultimately killed three people.  Katherine Ramsland, Movies Made Me Murder, TRU TV, 
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/criminal_mind/psychology/movies_made_me_kill/4.html (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2011).  Loukaitis later claimed he was inspired by a music video from Pearl Jam called 
“Jeremy,” which depicted a student taking guns to school and shooting people.  Id. 
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Columbine High School shootings.14  On April 20, 1999, two teenagers brought 
weapons to Columbine High School and began a violent siege during which they 
killed thirteen people (twelve students and one teacher) and wounded many others, 
until finally turning the guns on themselves.15  Subsequent investigations into the 
lives of the shooters revealed their obsession with the video game, Doom, a first 
person shooter.16  
As a result of this link between the shooters and a violent video game, the 
public outcry and concern about the effects of violent media on children was 
renewed prompting the government to take a closer look at regulations in the 
entertainment industry.17  Prior to the events at Columbine, federal regulations of 
violence were fairly limited.18  In the early ‘90s, concerns with expressions of 
violence in popular music lyrics and television programming resulted in a report by 
the American Psychological Association (“APA”) revealing the long-term effects 
of children viewing violence.19  The potential damage to children reported by the 
APA and other similar studies prompted Congressional hearings between 1994 and 
1995 to decide what should be done to address these issues.20  In response to these 
federal investigations, the major television networks agreed to take a closer look at 
their programming and undertake stricter policies of self-regulation.21  An 
agreement was also reached between the television networks and the government 
concerning the installation of a “V-chip,” which allowed parents to regulate what 
programs and channels their child could watch.22  But after the Columbine High 
School shootings in 1999, these previous regulations were not enough to satisfy the 
governmental inquiry into the effects of children viewing violence.23  
The extreme violence exhibited by the Columbine shootings prompted 
                                                          
14 Thomas A Hemphill, The Entertainment Industry, Marketing Practices, and Violent Content: 
Who’s Minding the Children?, 108 BUS. & SOC. REV. 263, 263 (2003), available at 
 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8594.00164/pdf [hereinafter Hemphill II]; see also 
Gregory Kenyota, Thinking of the Children: The Failure of Violent Video Game Laws, 18 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 785, 790–92; Kole, supra note 13, at 316.   
15 James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Overview; 2 Students in Colorado High School said to 
Gun Down as many as 23 and Kill Themselves in a Siege, N.Y. TIMES (April 21, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/21/us/terror-littleton-overview-2-students-colorado-school-said-gun-
down-many-23-kill.html?ref=columbinehighschool (calling the event, “the deadliest school massacre in 
the nation’s history”); see also Kenyota, supra note 14, at 790–91; Jennifer Rosenberg, Columbine 
Massacre, ABOUT.COM. http://history1900s.about.com/od/famouscrimesscandals/a/columbine.htm (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2011) (describing the Columbine High School shootings and the shooters in detail).  
16 Kenyota, supra note 14, at 790–91.  A first person shooter is a video game genre in which the 
player sees the game in from a first-person point of view and has a focus on shooting opponents.  Niko 
Silvester, First Person Shooter, ABOUT.COM, http://psp.about.com/od/pspglossary/g/firstpersshodef.htm 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011).  
17 Kenyota, supra note 14, at 791; Kole, supra note 13,,316. 
18 Hemphill, supra note 11, at 339.  
19 Id. at 339.  These effects included “(1) increased aggressiveness and anti-social behavior, (2) 
increased fear of being or becoming a victim, (3) increased decentralization to violence and victims of 
violence, and (4) increased appetite for more and more violence in entertainment and real life.”  Id.  
20 Id.; see also Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 263.  
21 Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 264.  
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
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President Bill Clinton to intervene.24  The President called upon the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”)25 and the U.S. Department of Justice to conduct a study on 
the practices of the entertainment industry soliciting violence to children. 26  
Specifically, President Clinton asked these agencies to investigate two questions: 
“[f]irst, do the industries promote products they themselves acknowledge warrant 
parental caution in venues where children make up a substantial percentage of the 
audience?  Second, are these advertisements intended to attract children and 
teenagers?”27  The FTC answered both of these questions in the affirmative and 
published a report of its findings.28  In its report the FTC stated that, based on its 
research, “a majority of the investigations into the impact of media violence on 
children find that there is a high correlation between exposure to media violence 
and aggressive, and at times violent, behavior.”29  It also found research that 
reported, “exposure to media violence is correlated with increased acceptance of 
violent behavior in others, as well as an exaggerated perception of the amount of 
violence in society.”30   
In its report, the FTC acknowledged the positive steps taken through the self-
regulation programs developed in each respective industry,31 but it also found that 
entertainment companies often market their products to children who are not in the 
appropriate age group designated by the company’s own rating or label.32  This 
contradiction between ratings and marketing tactics was the focus of the FTC’s 
report as well as the ease with which underage children could access materials 
                                                          
24 Id.; see also Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A Review of Self-Regulation and 
Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic Game Industries, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, 1 (Sept. 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/vioreport.pdf [hereinafter 
FTC Report 2000] (specifically discussing the impact of the Columbine shootings on prompting 
government action). 
25 The FTC was established in 1914 with the primary purpose of preventing unfair methods of 
competition in business as a part of the “bust the trusts” battle.  About the Federal Trade Commission, 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).  Since 
then, the authority of the agency has expanded and the FTC now strives to achieve: 
[E]ffective law enforcement; advances consumers’ interests by sharing its 
expertise with federal and state legislatures and U.S. and international 
government agencies; develops policy and research tools through hearings, 
workshops, and conferences; and creates practical and plain-language educational 
programs for consumers and businesses in a global marketplace with constantly 
changing technologies. 
Id. 
26 See Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 263.  These industries specifically included the musical 
recording, movie, and computer and video game industries.  Id.  
27 Id. 
28 Hemphill, supra note 11, at 340.  
29 FTC Report 2000, supra note 24, at ii. 
30 Id.  
31 Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 264.  Each segment of the entertainment industry has established 
self-regulation agencies.  Id.  These include the Motion Picture Association for motion pictures, the 
National Association of Broadcasters for television programming, the Recording Industry Association 
of America for musical recordings, and the Interactive Digital Software Association and Electronic 
Software Rating Board for video games.  Id. 
32 FTC Report 2000, supra note 24, at i.  
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expressly labeled for older audiences.33  The FTC also mentioned the importance 
of implementation of such self-regulation programs by companies in the 
entertainment industry when “considering the First Amendment protections that 
prohibit government regulation of content in most instances.”34  With these First 
Amendment protections in mind, the FTC came up with a three part conclusion to 
enhance the self-regulatory programs already in place.35  First, the “industry 
should establish or expand codes that prohibit target marketing and impose 
sanctions for violations.”36  Second, the entertainment “industry should improve 
the self-regulatory system compliance at the retail level.”37  And lastly, the 
“industry should increase parental awareness of the ratings and labels.”38 
Following publication of the 2000 report, Congress requested that the FTC 
conduct a follow up report in order to monitor the progress of the entertainment 
industry’s self-regulation efforts.39  Since that time, the FTC has conducted and 
issued six follow-up reports in order to oversee the progress and practices the 
entertainment industry has made in preventing underage children from viewing 
violent media.40  In its latest report, issued in December 2009, the FTC concluded 
that while there is room for improvement the “video game industry outpaces the 
movie and music industries in the three key areas that the Commission has been 
studying for the past decade: (1) restricting target-marketing of mature-rated 
products to children; (2) clearly and prominently disclosing rating information; and 
(3) restricting children’s access to mature-rated products at retail.”41  In light of the 
conclusion that the video game industry has been making strides through its self-
regulation efforts to prevent violent games from wrongfully being viewed by 
                                                          
33 Id.  
34 Id. at ii. 
35 Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 265; see also FTC Report 2000, supra note 24, at 54–56. 
36 FTC Report 2000, supra note 24, at 65.  With respect to this first action, the FTC recommended 
that the entertainment industry take measures that included prohibiting marketing of more mature rated 
products to audiences that are made up of a substantial percentage of persons under the age of 17, 
auditing ad placement to ensure these marketing limitations are actually taking place, and providing a 
“no buy” list to media retailers.  Id. 
37 Id. at 66.  The FTC listed several methods that industry members as well as third party retailers 
should practice including checking identification or requiring parental permission prior to selling or 
renting mature labeled titles, avoiding sales on websites unless they have a reliable age verification 
system, and finally, establishing guidelines for electronic transfer of media so that such transfers do not 
undermine the use of parental advisory labels.  Id.  
38 Id.  To accomplish this goal, the FTC recommended that ratings or advisory labels and 
descriptors should be clearly displayed in all ads and on all packaging.  In addition, labeling and rating 
information should be included in reviews and ratings should be displayed anywhere media can be 
sampled, purchased or downloaded including the Internet.  Id.  
39 See Hemphill II, supra note 14, at 265.  
40 All the reports can be accessed via the Federal Trade Commission’s website under the 
Commission and Staff Reports page.  The overall organization and structure of the reports are consistent 
and include a specific section for the three investigated industries: motion pictures, music recording, 
and electronic games.  Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A Sixth Follow-up Review of 
Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic Game Industries, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, 1 (Dec. 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/12/P994511violententertainment.pdf 
[hereinafter FTC Follow-Up Report 2009]; see generally Commission and Staff Reports, FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/index.shtm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).  
41 FTC Follow-Up Report 2009, supra note 40, at 30.  
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underage children, it seems California’s legislation banning the sale of violent 
games to minors is an overreaction.42  
B.  The Video Game Industry and Ratings 
There is no denying the popularity and pervasiveness of the video game 
industry.  According to the Entertainment Software Association (“ESA”), “68% of 
American households now play video games, with three quarters of all gamers age 
18 or older.”43  In 2010, video game sales totaled around $15.5 billion, not 
including sales of video game consoles.44  Although sales in 2010 did not increase 
from sales in 2009, it was still a large increase when compared to the $11.7 billion 
in revenue from 2008.45  Based on last year’s sales, the industry has seen a rise in 
the sale of mobile game applications and other new technology formats.46  In 
addition social gaming and online gaming have become increasingly popular as 
more people join social networks such as Facebook.47  The video game industry is 
continually expanding as new platforms and technologies become available, such 
as the gesture based control system, the Kinect for Xbox 360.48 
As more and more video game content is created, the more important the 
Entertainment Software Rating Board (“ESRB”) game ratings become.  The ESRB 
is a non-profit, self-regulatory agency that was established by the ESA in 1994.49  
The ESRB rating is voluntary; meaning video games are not legally required to 
carry an ESRB rating.50  However, most retailers and distributors have policies to 
only carry and stock ESRB rated games.51  The ESRB currently has seven ratings 
symbols that suggest the appropriate age for the player of the game as well as 
content descriptors, which indicate the presence of certain elements in a game that 
may be of interest or concern to parents.52  The rating symbols include: Early 
Childhood (“EC”), Everyone (“E”), Everyone 10 and older (“E10+”), Teen (“T”), 
Mature (“M”), Adults Only (“AO”), and Rating Pending (“RP”).53  There are 30 
                                                          
42 See infra notes 337–39.  
43 FTC Follow-Up Report 2009, supra note 40, at 23.  
44 Jessica Mintz, US sales of video game content flat in 2010, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/US-sales-of-video-game-apf-2637529385.html?x=0&.v=2. 
45 Id.; see FTC Follow-Up Report 2009, supra note 40, at 23.  
46 Mintz, supra note 44. 
47 See Dean Takahashi, The top 12 trends of the video game industry, GAMESBEAT (May 15, 
2009), http://venturebeat.com/2009/05/15/the-top-12-trends-of-the-video-game-industry/. 
48 Id.  
49 ESRB Frequently Asked Questions, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, http://www. 
esrb.org/ratings/faq.jsp#1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Game Ratings & Descriptor Guide, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, http://www. 
esrb.org/ratings/ratings_guide.jsp#rating_symbols (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).  
53 Id.  Early Childhood ratings are suitable for children ages 3 and over, and contain no content that 
a parent would find inappropriate.  Id.  Titles rated for Everyone contains content suitable for children 
ages 6 and over, and such titles can contain minimal cartoon or fantasy violence as well as mild 
language.  Id.  Everyone 10 and older ratings indicate the content is appropriate for children ages 10 and 
over, but may contain mild violence and language.  Id.  Teen rated titles are appropriate for children 
ages 13 and older and may contain “violence, suggestive themes, crude humor, minimal blood, 
94 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:I 
 
different content descriptors that cover a range of elements from violence and 
sexual content to alcohol and drug use.54  The purpose of such content descriptors 
is to provide consumers with additional information about content in the game, but 
they are not intended to list every type of content in a game that a player might 
encounter.55  Furthermore, the absence of a content descriptor does not necessarily 
mean that type of content is completely nonexistent in the game, and such 
descriptors do not “always refer to precisely the same type or intensity of material 
depending on the rating category that accompanies it.”56  Thus, the meaning of the 
content descriptors is dependent upon the rating of the game.  
Over the past five years, M-rated video games have only accounted for an 
average of 9% of total video game sales.57  E-ratings, however, have taken up 
nearly 51% of game sales in the same time period.58  T-rated titles average 23% of 
sales while E10+ rated games average 17% of sales.59  In addition, almost every 
year E-rated titles outsell both M-rated and T-rated titles combined.60  Although E-
rated titles consistently take up a majority of the market sales, the number one 
selling game in 2010 was an M-rated game called Call of Duty: Black Ops.61  This 
game sold more than twelve million units in the United States, which was nearly 
double the sales of the next best selling game, Madden NFL 11, an E-rated game.62  
Of the top ten selling games across all platforms for 2010, 63 five titles were rated 
M, while four titles were rated E and one title was rated E10+.64  These sales 
                                                          
simulated gambling, and/or infrequent use of strong language.”  Id.  Mature rated titles are intended for 
audiences 17 and older, and often include violence, blood and gore, sexual content and strong language.  
Id.  Adults only ratings are intended only for audiences 18 and over, and may contain “prolonged scenes 
of intense violence and/or graphic sexual content and nudity.”  Id.  Lastly, rating pending symbol refers 
to titles that have been submitted to the ESRB, but have not yet received a final rating.  Id.  The RP 
rating only occurs in advertisements for games that have not yet been released.  Id. 
54 See Id.  Often content descriptors are preceded by the term “Mild,” which means that the type of 
content is low in frequency or intensity.  Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See ESRB Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 49. 
57 Ben Reeves, Rated for Sale, GAMEINFORMER, Nov. 2010, at 23.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Jim Reilly, The Best Selling Games of 2010, IGN (Jan. 14, 2011), http://wii.ign.com/articles/ 
110/1107080p1.html.  
62 Id.; Madden NFL 11, IGN,  http://wii.ign.com/objects/043/043556.html (last visited Nov. 7, 
2011). 
63 “Across all platforms” means games play on all game consoles including Xbox 360, PlayStation 
3, PlayStation 2, and Wii, as well as personal computers (PC) and portable game players.  
64 Reilly, supra note 61; Rating Information: Halo Reach, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ 
ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=29447 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Rating Information: New Super 
Mario Bros. Wii, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=27877 (last visited Nov. 
11, 2011); Rating Information: Red Dead Redemption, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ 
synopsis.jsp?Certificate=28989 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Rating Information: Wii Fit Plus, ESRB, 
http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=27003 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Rating 
Information: Just Dance 2, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=29739& 
searchkeyword=just dance 2 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Rating Information: Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 2, ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/synopsis.jsp?Certificate=27566 (last visited Nov.11, 
2011); NBA 2K11-final boxart, ESRB rating, GONINTENDO (Sept. 27, 2010), http://gonintendo.com/ 
viewstory.php?id=137420. 
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figures show that while M-rated titles may only account for about 10% of total 
video game sales, such titles are still widely popular and fly off the shelves.  
The difficulty with California’s legislation is that it does not take the ESRB 
ratings into account when classifying games as “violent.”. Thus, content given a T-
rating by the ESRB, may still be considered a “violent video game” under 
California’s statute. Such contradictory determinations between the state and the 
ESRB would most likely create vast consumer confusion.  Additionally, the 
ambiguity in the process of determining what games are considered regulated for 
the purposes of California’s law will most certainly lead to self-censoring by the 
video game industry, which will not want to risk prosecution.65  
C.  Legislative History 
California Civil Code §§1746-1746.5 were signed into law by Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2005.66  However, the Video Software Dealers 
Association (“VSDA”) and the Entertainment Merchants Association (“EMA”) 
brought a suit in the Northern District of California against the state seeking to 
permanently enjoin enforcement of the law.67  Subsequently, VSDA and EMA 
filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.68  California filed a 
timely appeal in the Ninth Circuit to reverse the district court’s decision.69  The 
State argued that the California statute constitutionally regulated the distribution of 
violent video games.70  The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed and affirmed the 
district court’s order in 2009.71  The State of California once again appealed to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, and, somewhat surprisingly, the petition for 
certiorari was granted.72   
On November 2, 2010, the Supreme Court heard the case.73  Deciding 
whether the statute adequately describes the types of games to be regulated is only 
one problem the Supreme Court must address in its decision.  Additionally, the 
Court must determine whether California’s statute is unconstitutional based on 
whether it violates the First Amendment and whether it is invalid on vagueness 
                                                          
65 See infra text accompanying notes 364–402.  
66 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5. 
67 Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2009). 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 952–53. 
70 Id. at 967. 
71 Id. 
72 See Ben Parfitt, US: Concern builds over new game laws, MCV (July 6, 2010), 
http://www.mcvuk.com/news/39887/US-Concern-builds-over-new-game-laws (quoting Take Two’s 
Strauss Zelnick as saying, “[i]t’s very, very surprising that the Supreme Court is hearing the case.”).  
Strauss Zelnick is the former chairman of Take Two Incentive, a large video game publisher.  Dean 
Takahashi, Take-Two’s Strauss Zelnick talks about games beyond Grand Theft Auto, GAMEBEAT.COM 
(June 17, 2009), http://venturebeat.com/2009/06/17/take-twos-strauss-zelnick-talks-about-games-
beyond-grand-theft-auto/.  Take Two publishes the popular Grand Theft Auto Series.  Id.  
73 During the oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Kagan cited Postal 2 as the 
only clearly identifiable example of the type of video game California’s law seeks to ban, “but 
presumably the statute applies to more than one video game.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, 
Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448) (argued Nov. 2, 2010). 
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grounds. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE OBSCENITY STANDARD 
The First Amendment ensures that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”74  Although the definition of speech under the 
Constitution is continually expanding, there are recognized freedoms that fall 
within this category.  These include the freedom to speak, the freedom to read, the 
freedom to write, and freedom of thought.75  Within all of these protected 
freedoms is the freedom of expression.  In protecting this right, the Court has 
stated, “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.”76 
In evaluating whether video games are expressive and therefore protected, 
many of the circuit and district courts have concluded that video games fulfill the 
requirements for expression.77  When determining whether certain conduct is 
expressive for the purpose of First Amendment protection, the court must consider 
“whether an intent to convey a particularized message is present, and whether the 
likelihood is great that the message would be understood by those who viewed 
it.”78  Because video games contain elements of “original artwork, graphics, music, 
storylines and characters similar to movies and television shows,” courts have 
ruled that they are forms of expression.  This qualifies them as deserving of First 
Amendment protection.79  
Not all categories of expression, however, are protected by the First 
Amendment,80 such as the category of obscenity.81  The U.S. Supreme Court first 
held that obscenity was not within the category of constitutionally protected speech 
in Roth v. United States.82  In Roth, the defendant was found to be in violation of 
California’s obscenity statute for disseminating obscene advertisements through 
the mail.83  Roth challenged the statute as unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court 
upheld the ruling on the basis that obscenity is not protected by the First 
                                                          
74 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  As such, when 
states challenge the First Amendment, they also often include a challenge to the Fourteenth Amendment 
based on the doctrine of incorporation.  
75 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 
193 (1952). 
76 Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).  
77 See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n v. Henry, 2007 WL 2743097, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007); 
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Video Software 
Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2004).  But see James v. Meow 
Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that an extension of the “First Amendment 
protection to video games certainly presents some thorny issues”).  
78 Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003).  
79 Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 651.  
80 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
81 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 480 (1957) (declaring that “this Court has always assumed 
that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.”).  
82 Id. at 485. 
83 Id. at 480.  
2011 VIOLENT VIDEO GAME REGULATION 97 
 
Amendment right to free speech.84  While the Court distinguished obscenity from 
sex, it defined obscene materials as those which, “deal[] with sex in a manner 
appealing to the prurient interest.”85  For example, portrayals of sex in art and 
literature are not inherently obscene, rather, it is the effect that certain sexual 
materials incite lustful thoughts that makes them obscene.86   
Recently, obscenity has been defined as limited to “[o]nly ‘works which 
depict or describe sexual conduct’ are considered obscene and therefore 
unprotected.”87  The standard for obscenity was established by the Supreme Court 
in the case of Miller v. California.88  In Miller, the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of a California statute that criminalized the dissemination of 
sexually explicit materials.89  The Court recalled the established definition of 
obscenity as “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient 
interest.”90  Because obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment, the Court 
explained that states can regulate such materials provided that the law is limited to 
“works, which taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which 
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, 
do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”91  The Court 
then proceeded to establish the three part test for obscenity, which requires 
determining:  
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.92 
The Court, however, qualified its holding by acknowledging the “inherent dangers 
of undertaking to regulate any form of expression.”93 
While the Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment protections to all 
persons equally, it has recognized the need to expand the definition of obscenity 
with respect to minors.94  In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court upheld a 
New York statute that regulated the sale of sexual materials to minors, despite the 
finding that the materials were not obscene as to adults.95  The Court explained 
that, “material which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily 
                                                          
84 Id. at 493. 
85 Id. at 487. 
86 Id.  
87 Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
88 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  
89 Id. at 18–19.  
90 Id. at 20 n.2 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 487).  
91 Id. at 24.  
92 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
93 Id. at 23.  
94 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).  
95 Id. at 635, 637.  
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constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children.”96  
Furthermore, “the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary 
according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from 
whom it is quarantined.”97  Thus, the Court established a separate standard of 
obscenity with respect to minors and, therefore, New York’s law did not violate 
the constitutionally protected freedoms of such minors.98 
More recently, in the context of video games, many states have repeatedly 
attempted to rely on the Court’s ruling in Ginsberg to support the proposed 
extension of obscenity with respect to minors to include violent content.99  
Because, however, the definition of obscenity does not include violence, this 
strategy has not been successful.  District and circuit courts continue to reinforce 
the distinction between the unprotected category of obscenity and the 
constitutionally protected category of violence.100 
Regulations on content protected by the First Amendment are typically held 
to a high standard of review.  The first step in reviewing laws regulating free 
speech is determining whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.  
Content-based regulations attempt to limit the actual message of the “speech,” 
while content-neutral regulations refer to statutes that are intended to protect the 
public in general, but incidentally impact speech.101  The statutes regulating the 
distribution of violent video games are content-based regulations because they are 
restricting the games based on their content.  Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid and therefore require application of the strict scrutiny 
standard of review.102   
In order for a law to be upheld under strict scrutiny review, it must be 
“narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”103  
Additionally, this analysis requires a determination of whether there is a less 
restrictive alternative that would serve the same government interest.104  With 
respect to the requirement of having a compelling state interest, the government 
must prove that “the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the 
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”105  
Courts have repeatedly found that statutes regulating the sale of violent video 
games do not survive the high standard of strict scrutiny review, either on the basis 
                                                          
96 Id. at 636 (quoting William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The 
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 85 (1960)). 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 638.  
99 These states include Michigan, Washington, Louisiana, Indiana, and Missouri.   
100 See Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F. 3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575–76 (7th Cir. 2001); Video Software 
Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
101 See R.A.V. v. City of Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385–86 (1992).  Example of a content-based 
regulation as opposed to a content-neutral regulation is that an ordinance banning fires is content-
neutral while an ordinance banning burning the flag is content-based.  Id. at 385.  
102 Id. at 382.  
103 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  
104 Id.  
105 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).  
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that the alleged governmental interest is not valid or that, despite the existence of a 
compelling interest, there are less restrictive alternatives available.106 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF OTHER CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS 
California’s attempted ban on the sale of violent video games is just one in a 
long line of attempts by state and local governments to regulate the distribution of 
violent video games to minors.107  In the last decade alone, there have been twelve 
cases brought before the federal courts to decide the constitutionality of state and 
local laws prohibiting the distribution of violent video games to minors.108  
Despite the variation in the language of the enacted statutes, the circuit and district 
courts have unanimously held that these regulations on the distribution of certain 
video games based on their violent content is unconstitutional under a strict 
scrutiny standard of review.  
Starting in 2000, the City of Indianapolis enacted an ordinance that limited 
the access of minors to violent video game content.109  The ordinance specifically 
forbade any operator of five or more video-game machines in one place, namely 
arcade operators, from allowing an unaccompanied minor to use a machine that 
would be “harmful to minors.”110  The term “harmful to minors” was defined as 
meaning that which, “appeals to minors’ morbid interest in violence or minors’ 
prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult 
community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for persons under 
the age of eighteen,” and contains, “graphic violence” or “strong sexual 
content.”111  The ordinance also required that such operators post appropriate 
warning signs and separate, by partition, “harmful” machines from other machines 
at that location.112  This includes concealing the viewing areas from persons on the 
other side of the partition.113  Lastly, the ordinance included provisions addressing 
the appropriate punishment for violations of the legislation, which included 
monetary penalties, and the revocation or suspension of the right to operate such 
machines.114 
In drafting this legislation, the City of Indianapolis cited studies that showed 
young people who played violent video games “display[ed] higher levels of 
hostility and anxiety, and that children who play violent video games repeatedly 
                                                          
106 See infra Part IV.  
107 See generally Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F. 3d 954, 958 (8th 
Cir. 2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2001); Entm’t 
Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Video Software Dealers 
Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
108 See infra Part IV in its entirety.  
109 See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573. 
110 Id.  
111 Id.  The ordinance further defined “graphic violence” as that representing, “realistic serious 
injury to a human or human-like being where such serious injury includes amputation, decapitation, 
dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or disfiguration.”  Id. 
112 Id.  Operators of less than five machines are subject to all, but the partition requirements.  Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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are conditioned to overcome built-in resistance to acting out violently in response 
to these emotions.”115  In addition, these studies showed that children often play 
out violent scenes they view in video games and develop motor skills required to 
carry out violent fantasies.116   
The ordinance, however, never went into effect since video game 
manufacturers and their trade association brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the 
law as a violation of the First Amendment.117  The district court, however, found 
that the ordinance did not violate the plaintiff manufacturer’s constitutional rights, 
and on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision finding that the ordinance 
significantly restricts expression without any compelling justification.118  Upon 
rendering its decision, the Seventh Circuit stated that, “[v]iolence and obscenity 
are distinct categories of objectionable depiction.”119  The importance of this 
distinction is that obscene materials are unprotected by the First Amendment 
because they are offensive, as opposed to the violent content in the regulated video 
games, which supposedly engenders harm on young children.120  The court admits 
that “[p]rotecting people from violence is at least as hallowed a role for 
government as protecting people from graphic imagery”; however, “[t]o shield 
children right up to the age of 18 from exposure to violent descriptions and images 
would not only be quixotic, but deforming.”121  In his opinion, Justice Posner 
acknowledges that video games may be different than other media because of their 
interactivity, but ultimately this distinction is erroneous since “all literature . . . is 
interactive; the better it is, the more interactive.”122  As such, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that the benefits of the Indianapolis ordinance were, at best, conjectural 
and therefore did not justify the city’s regulation on violent video games.123  The 
city tried to appeal the decision by writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, but this petition was subsequently denied.124 
Less than two years later, the Interactive Digital Software Association, along 
with other video game publishers and retailers, brought suit to enjoin the 
enforcement of St. Louis County Ordinance No. 20,193, which made it “unlawful 
for any person knowingly to sell, rent, or make available, graphically violent video 
games to minors, or to ‘permit the free play of’ graphically violent video games by 
                                                          
115 Exec. Order No. 1, Prohibition of Violent Video Games With Violent Content From City Rights-
of-Way And Public Property, CONSOLIDATED CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY (Mar. 13, 
2000), http://www.indygov.org/eGov/City/OCC/Documents/EO_1_2000.pdf.  
116 Id.  
117 Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573. 
118 Id. at 579.  
119 Id. at 574.  
120 Id. at 575.  
121 Id. at 575, 577.  
122 Id. at 577.  
123 Id. at 581.  In addition, the court recognized the “irreparable harm” such an ordinance would 
have on the plaintiff manufacturers because of the cost of altering their facilities and the loss of 
revenue.  Id.  In accordance with this order, the city was ordered to pay the arcade industry $318,000 for 
attorney’s fees.  Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE 
ASSOCIATION, 9, http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/EFCourtsandRulings2010.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2011). 
124 Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 573. 
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minors, without a parent or guardian’s consent.”125  The plaintiff companies 
argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional based on its violation of the First 
Amendment, however, the district court rejected this argument by concluding that, 
“video games were not a protected form of speech under the First Amendment.”126 
The plaintiff companies appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit, 127 
which reversed the district court’s findings after applying a strict scrutiny review to 
the St. Louis County ordinance.128  In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit first 
addressed the district court’s error in categorizing video games as a new medium 
that falls outside the protections of the First Amendment.129  The court stated that:  
If the first amendment is versatile enough to “shield [the] painting of Jackson 
Pollock,130 music of Arnold Schoenberg,131 or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll,”132 we see no reason why the pictures, graphic design, concept art, sounds, 
music, stories, and narrative present in video games are not entitled to similar 
protection.133  
In continuing its discussion that video games are validly protected by the First 
Amendment, the Eighth Circuit also stated that the fact that video games are 
interactive does not make them any less protected.134  To support this conclusion, 
the Eight Circuit drew on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Kendrick, finding that 
“literature is most successful when it ‘draws the reader into the story, makes him 
identify with the characters, invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to 
experience their joys and sufferings as the reader’s own.’”135   
                                                          
125 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F. 3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2003). 
126 Id.  
127 Id.  It is significant to note that on appeal, the plaintiffs did not challenge the ordinance’s 
restrictions on minors’ access to video games with strong sexual content.  Id.  
128 Id. at 960.  
129 Id. at 957 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995)).  
130 Jackson Pollock was an American painter, best known for his work in the style of Abstract 
Expressionism, an art form characterized by free-associative gestures, often called “action painting.”  
See Francis Valentine O’Connor, Jackson Pollock Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, 1, http://www. 
biography.com/articles/Jackson-Pollock-9443818?part=0 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).  His most famous 
works were the product of the “pouring” technique, which was the process of pouring or dripping paint 
onto a canvas.  Id. at 2.  The intensity of this technique earned him the nickname “Jack the Dripper” by 
Time magazine.  Id.  A catalogue of Jackson Pollock’s works can be viewed online.  See Jackson 
Pollock, THE ARTCHIVE, http://www.artchive.com/artchive/P/pollock.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).  
131 Arnold Schoenberg was a musical composer who was born in Vienna and was most recognized 
for his creation of a new method of composition, known as atonality.  Biography of Arnold Schoenberg, 
CLASSICCAT.NET, http://www.classiccat.net/schonberg_a/biography.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
His compositions are available on iTunes.  
132 “Jabberwocky” is a poem by Lewis Carroll that was incorporated into Carroll’s novel, Through 
the Looking Glass.  See Linda Sue Grimes, Lewis Carroll’s ‘Jabberwocky’: Sense and Nonsense, 
SUITE101 (April 13, 2007), http://lindasuegrimes.suite101.com/lewis-carrolls-jabberwocky-a18615.  
The Jabberwocky verse is considered an important nonsense poem that exemplifies Carroll’s mastery of 
language in that the poem is seemingly nonsensical, but upon closer analysis actually tells an intelligent 
story.  Id.  
133 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 957.  
134 Id.  
135 Id. (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)).  
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After determining that video games are a protected media under the First 
Amendment, the Eighth Circuit went on to state that the appropriate level of 
review for the ordinance was that of strict scrutiny since the proposed regulation 
was content-based.136  Furthermore, the circuit court rejected St. Louis County’s 
argument that graphic violence in video games was a part of the category of 
obscenity with respect to minors and therefore entitled to less constitutional 
protection.137   
Content-based regulations of speech must be justified by a compelling state 
interest and the law must be narrowly tailored to advance this interest.138  In 
applying this standard, the Eighth Circuit assessed the two compelling state 
interests put forth by St. Louis County: (1) that it has an interest in protecting the 
“psychological well-being of minors,” and (2) that it has an interest in “assisting 
parents to be the guardians of their children’s well-being.”139   
With respect to the county’s first interest, the Eighth Circuit found that while 
protecting the well-being of minors was a compelling state interest in the 
“abstract,” there must be solid proof that such an interest is threatened.140  
Essentially, the county “must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not 
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a 
direct and material way.”141  Although the county presented evidence of a study 
that indicated playing violent video games frequently leads to aggressive thoughts 
and behavior, the Eighth Circuit determined that this was not conclusive empirical 
evidence that violent video games cause psychological harm to minors.142  In the 
absence of such substantial evidence, the circuit court concluded that the county’s 
regulation on the sale and rental of violent video games could not be justified.143  
In analyzing the county’s second compelling interest, the Eighth Circuit 
agreed that a parent’s authority to direct the rearing of their children is a 
fundamental part of society; however, the real issue was whether it was 
constitutionally permissible for First Amendment rights to be limited in order to 
aid such parental authority.144  
In support of this compelling state interest the county cited to Ginsberg, in 
which the Supreme Court found that the State of New York could regulate the sale 
of obscene material to minors.145  Based on its finding that such material was 
considered obscene with respect to minors, the Supreme Court applied the rational 
                                                          
136 Id. at 958.  
137 Id.  “Simply put, depictions of violence cannot fall within the legal definition of obscenity for 
either minors or adults.”  Id. 
138 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992).  The reason for this is that “content 
based regulations are presumptively invalid.”  Id. at 382. 
139 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958, 959.  
140 Id. at 958. 
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 959.  
145 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968).  
2011 VIOLENT VIDEO GAME REGULATION 103 
 
basis level of review to the New York regulation.146  The Eighth Circuit 
distinguished Ginsberg from the county ordinance based on the determination that 
Ginsberg involved speech that was not protected by the First Amendment, whereas 
the violent video games in the present case were considered protected.147  As such, 
the Eighth Circuit refused to apply the “less exacting” standard of the rational basis 
test in evaluating the constitutionality of the St. Louis ordinance.148  Furthermore, 
the Eighth Circuit stated that in neither Ginsberg, nor any other case for that 
matter, did the Supreme Court allow the government’s interest in helping parents 
protect their children’s well-being justify the regulation of what minors read and 
watch.149 
Based on this interpretation of Ginsberg, the Eighth Circuit clarified its 
holding by saying, “[w]e do not mean to denigrate the government’s role in 
supporting parents, or the right of parents to control their children’s exposure to 
graphically violent materials.  We merely hold that the government cannot silence 
protected speech by wrapping itself in the cloak of parental authority.”150  As such, 
the circuit court determined that finding an interest in parental aide compelling 
would “invite legislatures to undermine the first amendment rights of minors willy-
nilly under the guise of promoting parental authority.” 151  Therefore, the St. Louis 
ordinance regulating the sale of violent video games was deemed 
unconstitutional.152 
In 2003, the Washington State Legislature passed a law prohibiting the sale 
or rental of any violent video games that depicted harm to a human form that was 
recognizable as a law enforcement officer.153  A number of the companies and 
associations that create, publish, distribute, sell, or rent video games brought suit in 
the district court as plaintiffs to enjoin enforcement of the law based on the 
argument that it violated the First Amendment.154   
In its analysis of the constitutionality of the Washington law, the district 
court first addressed whether video games were actually protected by the First 
Amendment.  To make this determination, the court considered “whether an intent 
to convey a particularized message is present, and whether the likelihood is great 
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”155  The district 
court acknowledged that early video games probably lacked the requisite 
“expressive element”; however, today’s games often involve story lines, original 
scores, and complex narratives, which require the player to make choices and gain 
                                                          
146 Id. at 639–43.  
147 Interactive Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 959.  
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 959–60.  
150 Id. at 960.  
151 Id.  
152 Id.  Because of this finding, the circuit court did not reach the issue of whether the regulation 
was unconstitutionally vague.  Id.  As a result, the Court ordered the County to pay the plaintiffs 
$180,000 for attorneys’ fees.  See Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings, supra note 
123, at 8. 
153 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.91.180 (2003).  
154 Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2004).  
155 Id. at 1184 (quoting Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
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experience through play.156  As such, today’s video games qualify as expression, 
and, subsequently speech, which is protected by the First Amendment.157 
The defendants, represented by prosecuting attorney Norm Maleng, 158 
argued that despite the expressiveness of video games, they fall into a category of 
unprotected speech, namely obscenity.159  The district court addressed this 
argument beginning with an analysis of the Latin root for obscenity, which literally 
means “filth.”160  It also reviewed the recognized legal definition of obscenity 
stated by the Supreme Court in Miller, which includes material that is “disgusting 
to the senses [and] grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is 
appropriate.”161  While the district court acknowledged that graphically violent 
video games such as Grand Theft Auto: Vice City fall within the general definition 
of obscenity, they still do not fit within the legal definition of obscenity.162  The 
legal definition of obscenity is limited to sexual material and is for that reason 
unprotected by the First Amendment.163  
The district court also addressed the defendant’s acknowledgement that the 
enacted law does not regulate content that is obscene by the legal definition.164  
Nevertheless, the defendants argued that the legal definition of obscenity should be 
expanded “to include graphic portrayals of violence.”165  In rejecting this 
argument, the district court cited not only the lack of case law supporting such a 
proposition, but also the different effects caused by a ban on sexually explicit 
content as opposed to a ban on violent content.  The court reasoned that the 
“prevention and punishment of lewd speech has very little, if any, impact on the 
free expression of ideas . . . The same cannot be said for depictions of violence.”166  
Additionally, the district court distinguished Ginsberg, which the defense 
argued had broadened the definition of obscenity with respect to minors to include 
violence.167  In its analysis, the district court recognized the broadening of the 
obscenity definition, however, it stated that, “[t]he statute at issue in Ginsberg did 
not create an entirely new category of unprotected speech; rather it adjusted the 
Roth definition of obscene material to capture that which is of sexual interest to 
minors.”168  As such, nothing less than the full protection of the First Amendment 
is applicable to the video games in dispute.  
Following its determination that video games are entitled to full protection 
                                                          
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Norm Maleng was the prosecuting attorney for King County, Washington for 28 years.  See 
Patrick Roberts, Maleng, Norm, HISTORYLINK.ORG (June 12, 2007), http://www.historylink.org/index. 
cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=8180.  
159 Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.  
160 Id.  
161 Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973)).  
162 Id.  
163 Id.  
164 Id.   
165 Id.  
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 1186.  
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by the First Amendment, the district court applied the traditional strict scrutiny 
standard of review to the statute.169  In doing so, the court reviewed the two 
compelling interests offered by the State: “(1) ‘to curb hostile and antisocial 
behavior in Washington’s youth’ and (2) ‘to foster respect for public law 
enforcement.’”170  The district court agreed that protecting the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors is a widely recognized compelling interest.171  
Nevertheless, it determined that the research presented by the State failed to show 
that “exposure to video games that ‘trivialize violence against law enforcement 
officers’ is likely to lead to actual violence against such officers.”172  
Based on this finding, the court went one step further and reasoned that the 
lack of substantial evidence made it impossible to determine that the statute would 
have the intended affect on minors.173  It declared that, “[e]ven if defendants were 
able to show a causal connection between violent video games and real-life 
aggression in minors, the record does not support the finding that the Act is likely 
to curb such aggression in a direct and material way.”174  
The district court finished its strict scrutiny analysis with the conclusion that, 
even if the State had a compelling state interest in preventing violence and 
aggression in minors towards law enforcement officers, it is not the least restrictive 
alternative to achieving that end since it “impact[s] more constitutionally protected 
speech than is necessary . . . .”175 
The district court did, however, contemplate whether a state could ever enact 
a constitutional law banning the distribution of video games to minors.  It 
answered “‘probably yes’ if the games contain sexually explicit images . . . and 
‘maybe’ if the games contain violent images, such as torture and bondage, that 
appeal to the prurient interest of minors.”176  The court also laid out the framework 
for future attempts to regulate the sale of video games based on their content by 
listing the key considerations for such an inquiry.177  
                                                          
169 Id.  The court laid out its analysis under this standard by stating that the statute “will be upheld 
only if defendants can show that the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that 
it is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”  Id.  
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1186–87.  
172 Id. at 1188.  
173 Id. at 1189.  The court ultimately came to this determination in its finding that the statute was 
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.  Id.  It reasoned the statute was over-inclusive since it would 
not only ban games depicting violence against police officers, but it would also ban games depicting 
heroic struggles against corruption and oppression.  Id.  With respect to the problem of under-inclusion, 
the statute has no effect on minors’ access to other generally violent video games because it is limited to 
only those games that depict violence against police officers, but fails to encompass those other brutally 
violent games that portray violence against other people, often women and child.  Id.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 1190.  
177 See id.  These key considerations are as follows: 
[D]oes the regulation cover only the type of depraved or extreme acts of violence 
that violate community norm and prompted the legislature to act?  Does the 
regulation prohibit depictions of extreme violence against all innocent victims, 
regardless of their viewpoint or status?  [A]nd do the social scientific studies 
support the legislative findings at issue? 
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Finally, the district court addressed the challenge that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague, unlike previous circuit opinions.178  It determined that 
the statute was vague based on the effects it would have on the video game 
industry.179  Not only would overly cautious game store clerks be susceptible to 
withholding games from minors that were not covered by the statute, but also that 
video game publishers and designers would most likely be more cautious in their 
game design in order to ensure their game did not fall under the restrictions of the 
statute.180  As such, the vagueness of the statute rendered it unconstitutional on 
these grounds as well.181  
Less than a year after Washington struck down the State’s attempt to regulate 
the distribution of violent video games, the United States District Court of the 
Northern District of Illinois heard a case brought by the video game industry to 
enjoin enforcement of an Illinois law that would regulate the sale and rental of 
violent video games to minors.182  On July 25, 2005, the State of Illinois signed 
into law the Illinois Public Act 94-0315, which effectively created two new 
criminal statutes: the Violent Video Games Law (“VVGL”) and the Sexually 
Explicit Video Games Law (“SEVGL”).183  The VVGL specifically criminalized 
the selling or renting of violent video games to minors including a minor’s use of 
self-electronic checkout scanners to purchase such games.184  It also required that 
such violent games be labeled with a two by two-inch sticker stating “18.”185  The 
statute also gave a definition for what constitutes a violent video game, which are 
those games that include, “depictions of or simulations of human-on-human 
violence in which the player kills or otherwise causes serious physical harm to 
another human.”186  Violations of the VVGL incurred fines between $500 and 
$1,000.187 
The very same day the new laws were passed, various video game 
organizations including the VSDA and the ESA brought suit to enjoin enforcement 
of the laws on the grounds that the statutes violated their First Amendment rights 
to free speech.188  
Prior to the trial, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to consider the 
                                                          
Id.  
178 See id. at 1190.  
179 Id. at 1191.  
180 Id.  
181 Id.  Based on this ruling, the district court judge ordered the state of Washington to pay the 
plaintiffs $344,000 for attorney’s fees.  See Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings, 
supra note 123, at 8. 
182 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055, 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  
183 Id. at 1057.  The SEVGL included these same requirements.  Id.  
184 Id.  
185 Id. 
186 Violent Video Games Law, Pub. Act 94-315, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12A-10(e) (2005), 
invalidated by Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.  The statute further defined “serious physical 
harm” as “depictions of death, dismemberment, amputation, decapitation, maiming, disfigurement, 
mutilation of body parts, or rape.”  Id.  
187 Id.   
188 Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.  
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effect of violent video games on younger persons.  Specifically, the court focused 
on two main issues: (1) “whether minors who play violent video games experience 
an increase in aggressive thoughts, aggressive affect, and aggressive behavior,” 
and (2) “whether minors who play such games experience a decline in brain 
activity in the region of the brain that controls behavior.”189   
With respect to the first issue, the court conducted an in depth review of the 
research presented by the State, which was mainly comprised of testimony and 
studies by Dr. Craig Anderson.190  Based on this evidence, the court determined 
that, at best, Dr. Anderson’s research was inconclusive since there was nothing in 
his research to “establish a solid causal link between violent video game exposure 
and aggressive thinking and behavior.”191  Furthermore, Dr. Anderson failed to 
eliminate the most obvious alternative explanation for the results of his findings, 
which is that “aggressive individuals may themselves be attracted to violent video 
games.”192  The court also criticized the absence of any evidence in Dr. 
Anderson’s studies that distinguished between the effect of violent video games 
and the effect of other violent media, such as movies or television.193  Most 
notably, the district court stated that, “[e]ven if one were to accept the proposition 
that playing violent video games increases aggressive thoughts or behavior, there is 
no evidence that this effect is at all significant.”194 
In addressing the second issue regarding the effect of violent video games on 
brain activity, the court compared the conflicting testimonies of the defendant’s 
expert, Dr. William Kronenberger and plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Howard Nusbaum.195  
Again, the court conducted an in depth review in the opinion of both doctors’ 
research and testimony, ultimately siding with Dr. Nusbaum and concluding that 
there was no basis for the determination that “minors who play violent video 
games are more likely to ‘[e]xperience a reduction of activity in the frontal lobes of 
the brain which is responsible for controlling behavior.’”196  
After finding the State’s concern with the effect of violent video games on 
minors to be without support, the district court turned to the issue regarding the 
constitutionality of the VVGL.197  Based on the determination that the VVGL is a 
                                                          
189 Id. at 1058–59. 
190 Id. at 1059–62.  Dr. Anderson is a psychologist and professor at Iowa State University.  Id. at 
1059.  Dr. Anderson’s research revealed that he had conducted a series of studies that involved one set 
of college students playing a violent video game and another group playing a non-violent video game, 
during which time the students would either administer a noise blast signaling their victory, or would 
hear noise blasts signaling the victory of a pretend competitor.  See Craig A. Anderson et al., Violent 
Video Games: Specific Effects of Violent Content on Aggressive Thoughts and Behavior, 36 ADVANCES 
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 225–28 (2004).  
191 Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.  
192 Id.  
193 Id.  
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1062–66.  Dr. William Kronenberger is a clinical psychologist at the Indiana University 
School of Medicine who primarily works with and studies children and adolescents with behavioral 
disorders.  Id. at 1063.  Dr. Howard Nusbaum is a cognitive psychologist at the University of Chicago.  
Id. at 1066. 
196 Id. at 1067 (quoting the trial transcript at 356) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
197 See id. at 1071. 
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content-based regulation, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review.198  
The State claimed five interests that were promoted by the VVGL, which included: 
(1) “preventing violent, aggressive, and asocial behavior,” (2) “preventing 
psychological and neurological harm to minors,” (3) “eliminating societal factors 
that may inhibit the physiological and neurological development of its youth,” (4) 
facilitating the maturation of Illinois’ children into law abiding, productive adults,” 
and (5) “assisting parents in protecting their children from such games.”199  While 
the district court agreed that protecting children from violence and assisting 
parents were compelling state interests, it concluded that the VVGL did not meet 
the requirements under Brandenburg.200  Specifically, it found there was a lack of 
“substantial evidence showing that playing violent video games causes minors to 
have aggressive feelings or engage in aggressive behavior.”201   
In response to the State’s contention that the VVGL serves the compelling 
interest in preventing psychological harm to minors, the district court relied on the 
notion that our society is built on the practice of free thinking.202  The court quoted 
Justice Jackson in stating: 
“The priceless heritage of our society is the unrestricted constitutional right of each 
member to think as he will.  Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and 
we have no claim to it.  It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen 
from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from 
falling into error.”  These concerns apply to minors just as they apply to adults.203 
Thus, the district court reasoned that even if there was a compelling state interest 
in protecting the minds of children, the state cannot premise the regulation of free 
speech on how it may affect the listener, regardless of the listener’s age.204   
The district court also rejected the State’s argument that the Ginsberg 
holding permits the state to regulate violent video games with respect to minors.205  
It distinguished Ginsberg on the same grounds as Kendrick, in that Ginsberg 
allowed the State of New York to regulate obscene materials, however, it did not 
give the State the authority to regulate speech that was “harmful to minors.”206  As 
such, the VVGL could not be validated on the basis of the Ginsberg holding.207 
                                                          
198 Id. at 1072.  
199 Id.   
200 Id.  The court recognized that speech protected by the First Amendment may still be regulated 
based on its content if it meets the requirements of Brandenburg.  The speech must be “directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce such action.”  Id. at 
1073 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).  The court added, “the ‘glacial process of 
personality development’ that video games allegedly affect ‘is far from the temporal imminent that we 
have required to satisfy the Brandenburg test.’”  Id. at 1074 (quoting James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 
F. 3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
201 Id. at 1074.  
202 Id. at 1074–75.  
203 Id. (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442–43 (1950)).  
204 Id.  
205 Id. at 1075–76 
206 Id. at 1076.  
207 Id.  The district court also addressed the argument that the VVGL was unconstitutionally vague.  
Id.  Although it agreed that the meaning of certain terminology would be clear in many instances, in the 
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Lastly, the court briefly addressed the VVGL and SEVGL’s requirement that 
certain violent and sexually explicit video games be labeled with a sticker that read 
“18.”208  The court rejected the State’s argument that the lower “commercial 
speech” standard should be applied and, 209 instead, determined that the labeling 
requirement was compelled speech subject to the higher strict scrutiny standard 
since such a label contains no factual information about the game.210 
Based on its overall findings and the ultimate conclusion that the statutes 
were unconstitutional, the district court granted the plaintiffs a permanent 
injunction barring enforcement of both the VVGL and SEVGL.211 
On September 14, 2005, Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm signed into 
law an act that would regulate the distribution of video games defined as sexually 
explicit or ultra-violent explicit video games to persons under the age of 
seventeen.212  The law defines an “ultra-violent explicit video game” as one that 
“continually and repetitively depicts extreme and loathsome violence.”213  The law 
also defines “extreme and loathsome violence” as meaning “real or simulated 
graphic depictions of physical injuries or physical violence against parties who 
realistically appear to be human beings . . . .”214 
A number of creators, publishers and video game distributors, as plaintiffs, 
brought suit in federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of the law.215  In 
filing their complaint, the plaintiffs stated the law was invalid since it was in 
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and, therefore, 
unconstitutional.216  After being granted a temporary injunction, the plaintiffs 
moved for summary judgment on their claims, which the district court ultimately 
granted.217 
In the first part of its analysis, the district court focused on the issue of 
whether video games were a protected form of expression under the First 
Amendment.218  It determined that the original artwork, music, storylines, and 
                                                          
context of the video game industry, the statute would leave retailers and game publishers guessing as to 
what types of games are considered violent for the purposes of the statute.  Id. at 1077.  Thus, the 
statute also fails for its unconstitutional vagueness.  Id.  
208 Id. at 1081. 
209 “Commercial speech” is defined as disclosures that are “purely factual and uncontroversial” and 
“intended to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”  Id. at 1081 (quoting 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651–52 (1985)).  The 
appropriate level of review for such speech is the lower level rational basis test.  Id. 
210 Id. at 1081–82. 
211 Id.  The State of Illinois later appealed the district court’s ruling, but only with respect to the 
SEVGL.  See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).  Accordingly, the 
State was ordered to pay the plaintiffs $510,000 for attorney’s fees.  See Essential Facts: About Video 
Games and Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 7. 
212 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D. Mich. 2006).  See also 
2005 Mich. Pub. Acts 108.  
213 2005 Mich. Pub. Acts 108, part II.  
214 Id. 
215 Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 649.  
216 Id.  
217 Id.  
218 Id. at 650. 
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characters in video games were not unlike those in movie and television shows, 
which are both protected by the First Amendment.219  In addition, the district court 
rejected the defendants’ argument that video games were a distinct category of 
media based on its interactive functionality.220  The court reasoned that while 
video games are an ever expanding technology, with advancements that allow 
players to interact and control the fate of their characters more than ever before, 
“[i]t would be impossible to separate the functional aspects of a video game from 
the expressive, inasmuch as they are so closely intertwined and dependant on each 
other in creating the virtual experience.”221  As such, video games are considered 
to contain expressive free speech that is protected by the First Amendment.222 
Next, the district court applied the strict scrutiny level of review to the law, 
since it was seeking to infringe First Amendment rights of free speech.223  In doing 
so, it quickly dismissed the defendants’ argument that the appropriate approach 
was that in Ginsberg, relying on the lack of precedent to support such an 
application.224  In proceeding with its strict scrutiny review, the district court found 
that even if the law had satisfied the requirements in Brandenburg, “the State has 
failed to support its claims by ‘substantial evidence.’”225  The district court 
reviewed, somewhat in depth, the evidence presented by the defendants which 
included studies conducted by psychologists Dr. Craig Anderson and Dr. William 
Kronenberg.226  Dr. Anderson’s research was based on a “general aggression 
model”227 that suggested playing violent video games creates “automatized” 
aggressive thoughts and behaviors.228  The district court, however, was 
unconvinced by his studies finding they did not provide any “evidence that the 
relationship between violent video games and aggressive behavior exists.”229  Nor 
did they prove that “video games have ever caused anyone to commit a violent act, 
as opposed to feeling aggressive, or have caused the average level of violence to 
increase anywhere.”230  
The district court was even less impressed with Dr. William Kronenberg’s 
                                                          
219 Id. at 651.  
220 Id.  
221 Id.  
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 651–52.  As previously discussed, strict scrutiny requires that the State prove the law 
advances a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to advance such interest.  Id.  Before 
getting to its analysis, the court briefly addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that the law fails the three part 
test for radical speech outlined in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  Id. at 652.  It agreed that 
under the Brandenburg analysis, the law failed the first prong, which states that “free speech may be 
restricted if it ‘is directed to inciting or producing the imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce action’”  Id.  (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).  As such, there was no need to analyze 
the two other prongs of the test, however, the district court continued to apply the standard strict 
scrutiny review later in its opinion.  Id.   
224 Id.  
225 Id. at 652–53.  
226 Id. at 653.  
227 See Anderson, supra note 190, at 202–04. 
228 Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 653. 
229 Id.  
230 Id. (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578–69 (7th Cir. 2001)).  
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work, which failed to not only “provide concrete evidence that there is a 
connection between violent media and aggressive behavior, [but] it also fail[ed] to 
distinguish between video games and other forms of media.”231  
After finding the defendants’ evidence less than compelling to support their 
position, the district court further determined that the law does not advance the 
stated interest of the legislature.232  The State’s claimed interest is in protecting the 
physical and psychological well-being of minors as well as preventing violent and 
antisocial behavior.233  According to the district court, however, the law fails to 
achieve this end since it “fails to regulate other comparable forms of violent media 
from minors.”234  The most adequate demonstration of this point is that the State 
cannot achieve its stated interest when the law prevents a minor from purchasing 
games such as Resident Evil 4 or Doom 3, but still allows them to buy Resident 
Evil and Doom movies.235 
The district court completed the last part of the strict scrutiny analysis by 
stating that the law is not the least restrictive alternative to achieve its interests.236  
Other reasonable alternatives proffered by the court included an advertising 
campaign to better educate parents about the rating systems currently in place by 
the ESRB and further educate parents about what to look for when purchasing 
games for their children.237  As such, the district court ruled the proposed 
regulation of violent video games is unconstitutional since it failed to pass the 
strict scrutiny test required of such laws.238 
The district court also determined that the proposed regulation was 
unconstitutionally vague by looking at the effect the law would most likely have 
on retailers and game designers.239  It found that the definitions in the law would 
cause retailers to respond with self-censoring and limit access to certain titles for 
fear of severe civil and criminal liabilities.240  Furthermore, video game designers 
would be careful to create games that were well beyond the reach of the law in 
order to avoid any risk of penalties.241  
Only a few months after the Granholm decision came down, the governor of 
Louisiana signed an act into law for the purpose of prohibiting the distribution of 
                                                          
231 Id.  The district court also dismissed the joint statement of the American Medical Association, 
the American Pediatric Association and the American Psychological Association, which stated that 
violent video games have a “negative impact” on minors.  Id. at 653.  
232 Id. at 654.  
233 Id. 




238 Id. at 655.  
239 Id.  In order to avoid vagueness, “[t]he Constitution requires that statutes be set forth with 
‘sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.’” Id. (quoting 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).  
240 Id. at 656.  
241 Id.  Based on its ruling, the district court judge ordered the State of Michigan to pay the 
plaintiffs $182,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs for the resulting litigation.  See Essential Facts: About 
Video Games and Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 6.  
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video games “that appeal to a minor’s morbid interest in violence.”242  This 
immediately prompted both the ESA and the EMA to bring an action for a 
preliminary injunction in the district court of Louisiana.243  The two associations 
alleged that the law violated both the First and Fourteenth Amendments and was, 
therefore, unconstitutional.244 
The enacted statute criminalized the sale or rental of video games meeting a 
certain criteria to anyone under the age of eighteen.245  These special criteria 
included games that depict “violence in a manner patently offensive to prevailing 
standards in the adult community with respect to what is suitable for minors.”246  
The penalties for violating this law includes a fine of no less than one hundred 
dollars or imprisonment for no more than one year.247 
The district court began its analysis with the determination of whether video 
games are considered speech or conduct with respect to the First Amendment.248  
Relying on a series of previous district and circuit opinions,249 the Louisiana 
Middle District Court found that video games are considered speech, based on 
their expressiveness.250  It also added that the fact that such expression includes 
depictions of violence does not make it any less entitled to full constitutional 
protection.251 
Finding that the violent video games were deserving of full constitutional 
protection, the district court stated the appropriate level of review was strict 
scrutiny.252  Louisiana argued that the statute was enacted for two compelling state 
interests, which included preventing both “physical” and “psychological” harm to 
minors.253  The district court summarized these interests generally as “curbing 
violent behavior.”254  While the court acknowledged the importance of such an 
interest, it determined that regulation of constitutionally protected expression 
requires a satisfaction of the Brandenburg test.255  “Under Brandenburg, the 
                                                          
242 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (M.D. La. 2006); see also LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 91:14 (2008), repealed by 2008 La. Acts 220.  
243 Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 825.  
244 Id. 
245 Id.  
246 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91:14(A)(2) (2008), repealed by 2008 La. Acts 220.  
247 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91:14(C) (2008), repealed by 2008 La. Acts 220.  
248 Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 829.  
249 See generally Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650–51 (E.D. Mich. 
2006); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184–85 (W.D. Wash. 2004); 
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 572 (7th Cir. 2001). 
250 Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 829–30.  
251 Id.  The district court also followed precedent in finding that the interactive aspect of video 
games does not distinguish it from other media for the purposes of First Amendment protection.  Id. at 
830. 
252 Id.  The district court broke down the strict scrutiny standard into three distinctive parts: “(1) 
articulate a compelling state interest; (2) prove that the Statute actually serves that interest and is 
‘necessary’ to do so; and (3) show that the Statute is narrowly tailored and a material advancement of 
that interest.”  Id. at 831.  
253 Id.  
254 Id. 
255 Id.  
2011 VIOLENT VIDEO GAME REGULATION 113 
 
government must prove that the targeted expression, ‘is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.’”256  Because the proposed regulation of violent video games was based on 
the Louisiana legislature’s mere prediction that playing such games would tend to 
“encourage undesired behavior,” the court found that the State failed to satisfy the 
Brandenburg requirements.257  
The district court also agreed with the plaintiffs’ assertion that protecting 
minors from “psychological harm” is not a valid stated interest, as it “amounts to 
nothing more than ‘impermissible thought control.’”258  The court drew on support 
from the Supreme Court for this determination noting that, “First Amendment 
freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to 
justify its laws for that impermissible end.”259  As such, the district court found the 
State’s proffered interest in preventing psychological harm was not compelling 
since a state “may not restrict video game expression merely because it dislikes the 
way that expression shapes an individual’s thoughts and attitudes.”260  The court 
also dismissed the State’s presented scientific evidence as sparse, unreliable and 
ultimately inadequate to constitute the requisite “substantial evidence” for showing 
a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny standard.261 
In the second section of its strict scrutiny analysis, the court dismissed 
Louisiana’s arguments that the law was both narrowly tailored and the least 
restrictive alternative for protecting minors from harm.262  The court explained that 
banning violent video games would only shield minors from a “tiny fraction” of 
violent media since minors would still be able to legally buy the movies or books 
based on those same banned video games.263  Additionally, the court pointed out 
that there are less restrictive alternatives already available to achieve the State’s 
goals, such as educating people about the ESRB rating system and promoting the 
use and development of parental controls.264  Based on these findings, the district 
court ruled that the video game developers had proven there was a likelihood of 
success on their constitutional claims.265  
The district court also discussed the unconstitutional vagueness of the statute 
declaring that even if the statute is “aimed at protecting minors, it still must be 
                                                          
256 Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)) (emphasis added).  
257 See id.  Specifically, the court stated that “the government may not punish speakers based solely 
on a prediction of suspicion that their words will tend, in the aggregate, to encourage undesired 
behaviors.”  Id. 
258 Id.  
259 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002)).  
260 Id. at 832.  
261 Id. at 832–33.  Furthermore, the court found that even if the State were allowed more time to 
gather evidence to support its supposed interest, it is unlikely that they “will be able to establish that any 
video games are directed towards inciting imminent lawless action or that they are likely to cause such 
an action.”  Id.  
262 Id. at 833.  
263 Id.  
264 Id.  The court noted such alternatives would allow each individual household to decide “which 
games their children can play.”  Id.  
265 Id.  
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clearly drawn with standards that are reasonably precise.”266  After reviewing the 
language of the statute, the court determined that the lack of definitions for key 
terms such as “minor’s morbid interest in violence” and “patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community” was detrimental.267  The court also 
drew on precedent in other cases where similarly worded statutes were also struck 
down based on a finding of unconstitutional vagueness.268 
Thus, the district court concluded that enforcement of the Louisiana statute 
would cause “irreparable harm” not only to the plaintiffs, but the public as well 
because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.269  Three months later, 
Judge Brady issued an order directly from the bench that the preliminary injunction 
against enforcement of the law be made permanent.270  Judge Brady cited the 
reasons for his decision as those previously elaborated by the district court in its 
ruling on the preliminary injunction.271  
More recently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a 
permanent injunction against the enforcement of a Minnesota statute that sought to 
restrict the distribution of video games based on the ESRB rating.272  On May 31, 
2006, the Minnesota Restricted Video Games Act was signed into law prohibiting 
the sale or rental of a video game that had earned an ESRB rating of either AO or 
M.273  Violations of the law would incur a penalty of no more than $25.274  In 
addition, the statute required that all video game retailers post a sign advising 
minors of the aforementioned statute.275  
In response to the enacted legislation, the ESA and EMA brought suit in the 
federal district court seeking a permanent injunction, which was subsequently 
granted based on the finding that the violent video games in question were 
protected speech under the First Amendment.276 
In a brief opinion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
determination that violent video games are protected free speech and as such can 
only be regulated if there is a finding that the statute serves a compelling state 
                                                          
266 Id. at 835.  
267 Id.  
268 Id. at 835–36; see also Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 427 F. Supp. 2d, 646, 655–56 
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding the “lack of precision” in the statute’s definitions to be unconstitutionally 
vague); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding the lack 
of “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standard[s]” in a statute prohibiting the sale and rental of 
violent video games to minors unconstitutionally vague).   
269 Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 836–37.  A showing of “irreparable harm” is a prerequisite to the 
granting of a preliminary injunction.  See Plummer v. Am. Institute of Certified Pub. Accountants, 97 
F.3d 220, 229 (7th Cir. 1996).  As a result, the court ordered the state of Louisiana to pay the plaintiff 
video game associations $91,000 for attorneys fees.  See Essential Facts: About Video Games and 
Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 4. 
270 See Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 3. 
271 See id. 
272 Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 769 (8th Cir. 2008).  
273 Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 325I.06(1)-(2) (2006).  See also supra, note 53 (explaining the ESRB 
ratings). 
274 MINN. STAT. § 325I.06(2) (2006). 
275 MINN. STAT. § 325I.06(3) (2006). 
276 Swanson, 519 F.3d at 770.  
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interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that end.277  Minnesota offered two 
compelling interests: (1) protecting the psychological well-being of minors and (2) 
protecting the “moral and ethical development of minors.”278  The circuit court 
agreed that the appointed interests are compelling, much like previous courts; 
however, it distinguished itself from prior courts by saying it was not as 
“dismissive” in its finding that there was a lack of statistical certainty in 
establishing “a causal link between exposure to violent video games and 
subsequent behavior.”279  
Although the court took a more lenient view of Minnesota’s empirical 
evidence, it did compare the violence in video games to violence depicted in great 
literature, such as the Bible.280  The court found that even though it might be 
“risible to compare the violence depicted in the examples offered by the State to 
that described in classical literature, such violence has been deemed by our court 
worthy of First Amendment protection, and there the matter stands.”281  As such, 
the court relied on Interactive Digital Software Ass’n to affirm the district court’s 
findings regarding the State’s failure to meet its burden of proof.282 
As previously observed, every statute that has attempted to regulate the 
distribution of video games based on their violent content has been struck down as 
unconstitutional across all the circuits and districts.  Most courts have expressly 
recognized video games as a protected form of expression under the First 
Amendment and, additionally, that the Ginsberg standard does not create an 
entirely new category of speech unprotected as to minors.  
V.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
As previously stated in Part II, section c, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
signed into law California Civil Code §§1746-1746.5 (the “Act”) on October 7, 
2005, effectively imposing a civil penalty on all persons who sell or rent violent 
video games to minors.283   
Section 1746 of the California Civil Code defined the meaning of the terms 
“minor,”284 “person,”285 “video game,”286 and most importantly, “violent video 
                                                          
277 Id.  This standard is the strict scrutiny test.  Id. 
278 Id. at 771. 
279 Id. at 772.  
280 Id.  Specifically the court referenced a passage from Judges 4:21 in which “Heber’s wife [] 
picked up a tent peg and a hammer and went quietly to [Sisera] while he lay fast asleep, exhausted. She 
drove the peg through his temple into the ground and he died.”  Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Id.  Based on this determination, the Eighth Circuit refrained from discussing the other issues 
brought by the State on appeal including the over and under-inclusiveness of the statue.  Id. at 771.  The 
Attorney General later requested an en banc review of the appellate decision, however, this request was 
subsequently denied.  See Essential Facts: About Video Games and Court Rulings, supra note 123, at 5.  
Accordingly, the state of Minnesota paid the plaintiffs $65,000 for attorney’s fees and expenses.  Id. 
283 See Assemb. B. 1179, ch. 638 (Cal. 2005); Robert H. Wood, Violent Video Games: More Ink 
Spilled Than Blood – An Analysis of the 9th Circuit Decision in Video Software Dealers Association v. 
Schwarzenegger, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 103, 105 (2009). 
284 Under the statute, a “minor” is “any natural person who is under 18 years of age.”  CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1746(a) (West 2011).  
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game.”287  Specifically, the statute under §1746(d)(1) defined a violent video game 
as one “in which the range of options available to a player includes killing, 
maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being.”288  
Furthermore, if a game meets these criteria, then it must meet one of two 
standards.  The first standard has three requirements: that “[a] reasonable person, 
considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid 
interest of minors”; that the game “is patently offensive to prevailing standards in 
the community as to what is suitable for minors”; and that such actions “cause[] 
the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value 
for minors.”289  The second standard requires that the video game “[e]nable[] the 
player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images of human beings or characters 
with substantially human characteristics in a manner which is especially heinous, 
cruel, or depraved in that it involves torture or serious physical abuse.”290 
This regulation of video game sales prompted quick action from the VSDA 
and the ESA to file for a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California to stop the law from going into effect.291  
The plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to declaratory relief against the Act 
based on the fact that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.292  
According to the plaintiffs, the unconstitutionality of the Act was rooted in its 
restriction of the freedom of expression as a presumptively invalid content-based 
regulation.293  Both sides then proceeded to file cross-motions for summary 
judgment, but the district court ultimately ruled in favor of VSDA and ESA 
making the injunction permanent.294  The district court’s ruling effectively 
invalidated the Act based on the finding that the Act failed to pass the test of strict 
scrutiny, which is the appropriate level of review for regulations of free speech.295  
The State of California filed a timely appeal to the Ninth Circuit to reverse 
the district court’s grant of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.  The main issue 
on appeal was whether California’s statute was subject to the standard of strict 
scrutiny or, as the petitioners argued, was subject to the “variable obscenity” 
                                                          
285 Under the statute, a “person” is “any natural person, partnership, firm, association, corporation, 
limited liability company, or other legal entity.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(b) (West 2011).  
286 “Video game” is defined as “any electronic amusement device that utilizes a computer, 
microprocessor, or similar electronic circuitry and its own monitor, or is designed to be used with a 
television set or a computer monitor, that interacts with the user of the device.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1746(c) (West 2011).  
287 Katherine A. Fallow, Content Legislation and Resulting Litigation – Schwarzenegger v EMA 
1023, PRACTICING LAW INST. 357, 361 (2010).  
288 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2011). 
289 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A) (West 2011).  These three requirements are based on the 
Miller test for obscenity.  See supra note 88, at 12.  See supra Part III regarding the Miller standard. 
290 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(B) (West 2011).  
291 Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 
2007).  The VSDA and the ESA are companies that “create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video 
games.”  Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d, 950, 952 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). 
292 Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 953, 955.  
293 Id. at 955.  
294 Wood, supra note 283, at 105.  
295 Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 955–56. 
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approach established in Ginsberg.296  The second issue was whether the statute’s 
requirement of labeling every “violent video game” with a solid white “18” 
outlined in black constituted compelled speech under First Amendment 
jurisprudence.297  
With respect to the first issue, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case of 
Ginsberg in order to determine the appropriate level of review for analyzing the 
constitutionality of California’s statute.298  As previously discussed in the section 
on the obscenity standard, the Supreme Court in Ginsberg held that the state could 
specifically prohibit the sale of pornographic materials to minors based on the 
finding that such materials were obscene and, therefore, not protected by the 
freedom of speech under the First Amendment.  According to the Court, while the 
sexually-explicit materials in question were protected for distribution to adults that 
did not necessarily mean that such materials were constitutionally protected from 
regulation with respect to minors.299  As such, the Court reasoned that the “concept 
of obscenity . . . may vary according to the group to whom the questionable 
material is directed or from whom it is quarantined.”300  By applying this special 
application of the obscenity standard to minors, the Court effectively rendered such 
obscene material as undeserving of First Amendment protection, and therefore the 
appropriate standard of review was the lower threshold of analysis known as the 
rational basis test.301   
In applying the rational basis test, the Ginsberg Court offered two valid state 
interests to justify its regulation of obscene materials to minors: “(1) that 
‘constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to 
authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in 
the structure of our society’; and (2) the state’s ‘independent interest in the well-
being of its youth.’”302  
The State of California argued that these two justifications for allowing 
regulation of obscene content to minors in Ginsberg should be equally applicable 
to the regulation of violent content to minors.303  The Ninth Circuit, however, 
disagreed relying on the established jurisprudence of obscenity, “which relates to 
non-protected sex-based expression-not violent content.”304  The circuit court 
reasoned that when the Supreme Court in Ginsberg allowed the State of New York 
to regulate obscenity as to minors, it created a sub-category of obscenity that was 
not protected by the First Amendment as opposed to “an entirely new category of 
                                                          
296 Wood, supra note 283, at 105.  
297 Id.; Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 954.  
298 Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 959. 
299 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). 
300 Id. 
301 Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 959 (quoting the Court in Ginsberg as reasoning that “to sustain 
the power to exclude material defined as obscenity by [the statute] only requires that we be able to say 
that is was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is 
harmful to minors.”).  Id.  
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id.  
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expression excepted from First Amendment protection.”305  Thus, it determined 
that the Ginsberg “variable obscenity” approach was inapplicable to the present 
California statute regulating violent video game content to minors. 
The Ninth Circuit also noted the Supreme Court’s careful limitation of 
obscenity to sexual material in the past.306  This included the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Roth and Miller, which expressly confined the meaning of obscenity 
to sex-based material.307  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the opinions 
from other circuits including Kendrick, in which the Seventh Circuit upheld the 
distinction between obscenity and violence.308  The Ninth Circuit also pointed to 
decisions in the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, where the circuit courts 
declined the opportunity to extend the obscenity standard to violent content.309  In 
addition, the circuit court returned to the Ginsberg holding pointing to the Supreme 
Court’s own limitation of its ruling: 
We have no occasion in this case to consider the impact of the guarantees of 
freedom of expression upon the totality of the relationship of the minor and the 
State.  It is enough for the purposes of this case that we inquire whether it was 
constitutionally impermissible for New York . . . to accord minors under 17 a more 
restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves 
what sex material they may read or see.310 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit viewed Ginsberg to apply only in the context where the 
state intends to regulate the availability of sexually based material to minors, not 
violent material.311  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit declined the State’s invitation 
to expand the Ginsberg application to violent content and held that strict scrutiny 
remains the applicable standard of review.312  
Under the strict scrutiny standard,313 the California legislature advanced two 
compelling state interests: “(1) ‘preventing violent aggressive and antisocial 
behavior;’ and (2) ‘preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors who 
play violent video games.’”314  However, California clarified its interest as 
protecting the “physical and psychological well-being of the children,” as opposed 
                                                          
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 959–60.  See also supra, Part III. 
308 Schwarzenegger,, 556 F.3d at 960.  
309 Id.; see James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
obscenity jurisprudence did not extend to violent material); Eclipse Enters, Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 
66–68 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to put violent material “allegedly harmful to minors in the category of 
unprotected obscenity.”); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that videos “that contain [] violence but not depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct cannot 
be obscene.”). 
310 Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 960 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–37 
(1968)).  
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 960–61.  
313 The court articulated the strict scrutiny standard, which requires that the Act be narrowly 
tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest and that the Act is the least restrictive 
alternative.  See id. at 960.  
314 Id. at 961 (quoting the California legislature).  
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to protecting third parties from violent behavior.315  
Just as previous courts had recognized this interest as compelling, the Ninth 
Circuit also found the stated interest in protecting the physical and psychological 
well-being of children as an acceptable compelling interest.316  Despite the 
recognition that such an interest is compelling, the State must also “demonstrate 
that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural.”317  Before analyzing the 
State’s interest, the Ninth Circuit clarified that California’s asserted interest in 
protecting children from actual harm to their psychological health is separate and 
distinct from the State’s interest in controlling minor’s thought.318  “The latter is 
not legitimate.”319  As such, the State must show it has drawn “reasonable 
inferences” from the evidence presented that there is an actual harm to protect 
against.320 
With this standard in mind, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the State’s evidence, 
which was heavily concentrated on the work of Dr. Craig Anderson.321  Despite 
Dr. Anderson’s claims that exposure to violent video games is linked to increases 
in aggressive behavior, he admitted the shortcomings in the size of his study 
groups and “‘glaring empirical gap’ in video game violence research,” that 
undermined his assertions.322  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted the past circuit 
and district courts that repeatedly dismissed Dr. Anderson’s research as 
insufficient and/or inadequate.323  The second study relied on by the State was 
conducted by Dr. Douglas Gentile, who concluded that eighth and ninth graders 
who were exposed to violent video games were more hostile, which affected their 
performance socially and academically in school.324  However, the Ninth Circuit 
found this evidence also lacked substantiality because of the admitted 
“correlational nature” of the data gathered as well as the express disclaimers given 
in the study against drawing any causal conclusions.325   
The circuit court also reviewed two supplemental studies cited by the State in 
support of its asserted compelling interest, but these studies failed for the same 
reasons as Dr. Anderson and Dr. Gentile’s studies.326  Thus, based on these 
findings, the Ninth Circuit determined the State failed to meet its burden that there 
                                                          
315 Id. at 961.  This interest is primarily focused on the “actual harm to the brain of the child 
playing the video game.”  Id. 
316 Id.  
317 Id. at 962 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 662, 664 (1994)).    
318 Id.  
319 Id.  
320 Id.  
321 Id. at 963.  
322 Id. 
323 Id.; see Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2001) 578; 
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Entm’t Software 
Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
324 Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 963–64; see generally Douglas A. Gentile et al., The effects of 
violent video game habits on adolescent hostility, aggressive behaviors, and school performance, 27 J. 
ADOLESCENCE 5 (2005).  
325 Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 964.  
326 Id.  
120 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:I 
 
is a legitimate and compelling interest in protecting the psychological health of 
children since it could not provide substantial evidence to show that there is a 
causal relationship between exposure to violent video games and actual, physical 
harm to the brain.327 
The Ninth Circuit did not stop its analysis there.  It concluded that even if the 
State had proven that there is a compelling interest in preventing psychological 
harm to children, it cannot show that the proposed law is narrowly tailored to 
further that interest, nor can it demonstrate that the law is the least restrictive 
alternative.328  In making this determination, the circuit court cited the State’s 
misplaced focus on the “‘most effective’ means” of achieving its declared interest, 
as opposed to focusing on the “least restrictive means.”329  This misguided 
emphasis included the State’s argument that the ESRB ratings posted on video 
games are ineffective and that parental control technologies fail to appropriately 
address the State’s concerns.330  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit pointed out the 
existence of less restrictive alternatives dismissed by the State including improved 
education campaigns regarding the ESRB ratings directed at both parents and 
retailers.331  As such, the Ninth Circuit determined that California’s proposed law 
failed the strict scrutiny analysis rendering the law presumptively invalid.332 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed whether the statute’s labeling provision, 
which required all “violent video games” be labeled with a four square inch sticker 
stating “18,” was constitutional.333  The video game publishers argued that such a 
requirement is unconstitutionally compelled speech, since it conveys a message 
with which the plaintiffs do not agree.334  Before beginning its analysis, the court 
stated the relevant law that “freedom of speech prohibits the government from 
telling people what they must say.”335  However, there is an exception to this rule 
when the government attempts to prohibit “commercial speech,” which is used in 
advertisements and defined as “purely factual and uncontroversial information.” 
336   
The Ninth Circuit determined that the constitutionality of the labeling 
requirement was dependent on the court’s prior determination that the law’s 
prohibition on the distribution of violent video games to minors is 
unconstitutional.337  It reasoned that, “[u]nless the Act can clearly and legally 
characterize a video game as ‘violent’ and not subject to First Amendment 
                                                          
327 Id.  
328 Id. at 964–65.  
329 Id. at 965.  
330 Id. 
331 Id.  
332 Id.  
333 Id.  
334 Id.  
335 Id. at 966 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 
61 (2006)).  
336 Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985)).  
337 Id. at 966–67. 
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protections, the ‘18’ sticker does not convey factual information.”338  Additionally, 
“the State’s mandated label would . . . convey a false statement that certain 
conduct is illegal when it is not,” and, therefore, the State cannot require retailers 
to display false information on their products.339  Thus, the labeling requirement 
was ruled unconstitutional.340 
In its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit summarized its findings and repeated its 
disinclination to apply Ginsberg’s “variable obscenity standard” to the California 
statute.341  Thus, it affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs based on the conclusion that the California statute was unconstitutional in 
all respects.342  Accordingly, California reimbursed the EMA for costs incurred 
because of the appeal in the amount of $282,794.343 
Despite defeat in both the district and circuit courts, California successfully 
appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United States on grant of 
certiorari.344  To date, state and local taxpayers have paid the video game industry 
an estimated $2,158,916 in attorney’s fees and expenses as the result of the 
lawsuits generated by failed legislation.   
VI.  THE SUPREME COURT DECISION  
On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court issued its opinion on the 
constitutionality of California’s violent video game ban in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n.  In its 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court made three major 
holdings: (1) video games are deserving of First Amendment protection; (2) while 
there are limited exceptions to the prohibition against content-based governmental 
restrictions on expressions such as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words, new 
categories of unprotected speech may not be added; and (3) California failed to 
satisfy the burden of showing either that the law was justified by a compelling 
government interest, or that the law was narrowly drawn to serve that interest.345   
Justice Antonin Scalia346 wrote the opinion in which the Supreme Court 
expressed its view on violence in the media and the government’s role in 
protecting minors from certain media content.  After briefly summarizing the 
procedural history of the case, the Court explicitly affirmed the well-accepted 
                                                          
338 Id. at 967. 
339 Id.  
340 See id. 
341 Id. 
342 Id.  
343 Brown v. EMA, MEDIA COALITION, http://mediacoalition.org/VSDA-v.-Schwarzenegger- 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
344 See Boyd, supra note 8, at 1–3. 
345 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2729 (2011).  Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan joined in the majority opinion, while Justices Alito and Roberts 
concurred.  Justices Thomas and Breyer filed separate dissenting opinions.  
346 Justice Scalia made his view on the California legislation clear during oral arguments, on 
November 2, 2010.  During that time, he asked: “What’s next after violence? Drinking? Smoking? 
Movies that show smoking can’t be shown to children?”  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Video 
Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger , 556 F.3d 950 (2009) (No. 08-1148). 
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principle that video games qualify for First Amendment protection.347  The Court 
likened video games to other forms of entertainment, namely books, plays and 
movies.348  Although video games are distinct because of the player’s ability to 
interact within a virtual world, the Court reasoned that because video games 
communicate ideas and messages (just like books, movies, and plays), they are 
worthy of full First Amendment protection.349  The Court’s most notable 
evaluation, however, was its implication that future technologies will be subject to 
the same protections of the First Amendment.350  Specifically, the Court stated that 
“whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing 
technology, the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First 
Amendment’s command, do not vary when a new and different medium for 
communication appears.”351 
To support this reasoning, the Court referred to Ashcroft v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, which held that “as a general matter, . . . government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or 
its content.”352  The Court, however, was quick to acknowledge that there are 
exceptions to this rule, specifically with respect to the areas of obscenity, 
incitement, and fighting words.353   
The opinion next discussed its last term ruling from the case of U.S. v. 
Stevens, in which the Supreme Court struck down a statute criminalizing the 
creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty.354  Reiterating its 
previous holding, the Court explained that such restrictions on the depiction of 
animal cruelty were unconstitutional.  However, laws forbidding the actual 
commission of such acts were permissible.355  In Stevens, the government made a 
similar appeal to the Court, arguing that if the determined value of a particular 
category of speech was outweighed by the social costs, then that category of 
speech should be punishable.356  The Court related how it objected to such a 
conclusion because “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on 
content is part of a long . . . tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise 
the judgment of the American people . . . .”357  The Court determined that these 
same principles control in the case of restrictions on the distribution of video 
                                                          
347 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (stating that “California correctly acknowledges that video games 
qualify for First Amendment protection.”).  While this qualification was already well accepted and 
established, the Supreme Court’s own affirmation of this principle is historical because this is the first 
video game case to be heard by the United States Supreme Court.    
348 Id. 
349 Id.  
350 Id.  
351 Id.  It appears that the Court is trying to preempt future litigation that attempts to restrict 
emerging technologies because of its increased interactivity, such as the motion sensory technology of 
XBox’s Kinect and PlayStation’s Move systems.  
352 Id. at 2733 (quoting Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).  
353 Id. (citing to Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).  
354 U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582–83 (2010).  
355 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.  
356 Id.  
357 Id. (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1588) (internal quotations omitted).   
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games.358   
In light of this finding, the opinion next explained how California’s 
regulation is just another attempt by the legislature to “shoehorn speech about 
violence into obscenity.”359  This discussion included the Court’s comparison of 
the California’s violent video game regulation to the New York law that prohibited 
the sale of certain sexual content to minors in Ginsberg.360  The Supreme Court 
found it was of no consequence that California’s statute mimicked the 
constitutional law in Ginsberg, since speech about violence is not obscene, and 
therefore cannot be treated as such.361  The Court further distinguished the present 
case from Ginsberg by stating that the California law “does not adjust the 
boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition 
designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children . . . . Instead, it wishes to 
create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is permissible only 
for speech directed at children.”362  According to the Court, such a departure from 
the traditions of regulated speech is “unprecedented and mistaken.”363   
While the Court recognized that the State has a legitimate concern of 
protecting children from exposure to harmful media, this does not give California 
the limitless power to restrict the ideas and messages it believes are harmful to 
children.364  The Court quoted its previous decision in Erznozik v. Jacksonville, for 
emphasis that “[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some 
other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from 
ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”365  The Court 
then went on to explore the longstanding history of violence in children’s media, 
most notably in children’s books.366  The depictions of violence in fairytales such 
as Snow White and classics such as Homer’s Odyssey are just a few examples that 
illustrate the tradition of children’s exposure to violent content.367  
This led the Court to relate the history of action taken to restrict violent 
entertainment to minors.368  The first “villain” was dime novels depicting crime, 
followed by motion pictures, radio dramas, and comic books.369  After that came 
television and music.370  And most recently, violent video games are the perceived 
threat to children.  
At this point, the Court addressed California’s argument that video games are 
distinguishable from other forms of media because they are interactive in that the 
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player participates in the violence and determines its outcome.371  The Court, 
however, found this distinction uncompelling for two reasons.372  First, with 
respect to controlling the outcome of the game, this is a common feature akin to 
“choose-your-own-adventure stories,” which have been around since 1969.373  
Second, as for the player’s participation, the Court viewed this as “more a matter 
of degree than kind.”374  This increased interactivity, however, is not a strike 
against video games, and is in fact, a testament to their success at drawing the 
player into the experience.375 
The Court also addressed the concern with the goriness and severity of the 
violence depicted in the video games.376  While the Court acknowledged its disgust 
with the graphic depictions of dismemberment, decapitation, and disembowelment, 
“disgust is not a valid basis for restricting expression.”377  Indeed, the Court 
observed that these images are so intense that it ignites the viewer’s desire to put 
an end to this violence, but therein lies the problem with California’s legislation: 
“that the ideas expressed by speech – whether it be violence, or gore, or racism – 
and not its objective effects, may be the real reason for government 
proscription.”378  This is precisely the type of regulation that the First Amendment 
is designed to prevent.  
After its analysis rendering video games fully protected by the First 
Amendment, the Court found that California’s statute could only survive 
constitutional challenge if it met the burden of the strict scrutiny test.379  This 
required that California’s regulation on the distribution of violent video games to 
minors to be justified by a compelling government interest,380 and that the law be 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.381  Putting this standard into context, 
California must specify an actual problem that needs solving, and show that 
restriction on free speech is necessary to that solution.382 
Applying this high standard, the Court determined that California could not 
meet the first part of the test since it could not prove there is an actual problem in 
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need of a solution.383  In his opinion, Justice Scalia was quick to point out that 
California admits that “it cannot show a direct causal link between the violent 
video games and harm to minors.”384  Furthermore, the Court found the State’s 
evidence was not compelling for several reasons.  First, the State’s reliance on the 
research of Dr. Anderson and a handful of other psychologists was misplaced since 
“[t]hey do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively 
(which would at least be a beginning).”385  Rather these studies indicate there is 
merely a correlation between children’s exposure to violent entertainment and 
“miniscule real-world effects, such as children’s feeling more aggressive or 
making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent video game than 
after playing a nonviolent game.”386  Moreover, when presented with these studies, 
every court has rejected them.387   
The Court’s opinion then pointed out that one of the most glaring problems 
in Dr. Anderson’s research is that the effects caused by violent video games are 
small and indistinguishable compared to the effects caused by other media.  Most 
notably, Dr. Anderson admitted the effects on children who play violent video 
games are “the same effects [that] have been found when children watch cartoons 
starring Bugs Bunny or the Road Runner, or when they play video games like 
Sonic the Hedgehog that are rated ‘E’ or even when they view a picture of a 
gun.”388  In light of the finding that California seeks to protect children from the 
harmful effects of violent media by restricting the sale of violent video games only, 
the Court concluded the California statute was wildly underinclusive.389  The 
Court took issue with this result since it “raises serious doubts about whether the 
government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a 
particular speaker or viewpoint.”390  
Additionally, the Court concluded that the California law is also 
underinclusive for the reason that the statute allows these allegedly “dangerous, 
mind-altering” games to find their way into the hands of minors so long as a parent 
or guardian gives them permission.391  The opinion expressed the Court’s “doubts 
that punishing third parties for conveying protected speech to children just in case 
their parents disprove of that speech is a proper governmental means of aiding 
parental authority.”392   
Furthermore, the Court found that the California law did not substantially 
assist parents who wish to restrict their child’s access to violent video games, but 
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are unable to do so.393  In his analysis of this conclusion, Scalia highlighted the 
fact that the video game industry already has a voluntary rating system in place 
that addresses parental concerns by identifying the content of the game.394  
Moreover, he noted that the VSDA encourages game distributors to exhibit 
information the ESRB rating system in their stores and to abide by the system by 
refusing to sell “M” rated titles to minors without parental consent.395  Scalia also 
found the results of the FTC’s latest report on the marketing of violent media to 
children compelling.396  The opinion recounted the FTC’s summary finding in 
which “the video game industry outpaces the movie and music industries” in the 
three areas of most concern: “(1) restricting target-marketing of mature-rated 
products to children; (2) clearly and prominently disclosing rating information; and 
(3) restricting children’s access to mature-rated products at retail.”397  In light of 
the effectiveness of the video game industry’s self-regulation, the Court found that 
“[f]illing the remaining modest gap in concerned-parents’ control can hardly be a 
compelling state interest.”398   
Aside from the law’s underinclusiveness, the Court found the law 
overinclusive as well with respect to the claim that such a law supplements 
parental authority.399  Scalia’s opinion pointed out that the California regulation 
does not take into account the fact that some children who will be prohibited from 
purchasing video games under the law have parents who do not care whether their 
child is buying violent video games.400  As a result, the law’s purported aim to 
assist parental authority actually supports only what “the State thinks parents ought 
to want.”401  This overinclusiveness demonstrated that the California law was not 
narrowly tailored to serve its supposed compelling interest.402 
Before giving his final thoughts, Scalia qualified the opinion by stating that 
“[w]hile we have pointed out above that some of the evidence brought forward to 
support the harmfulness of video games is unpersuasive, we do not mean to 
demean or disparage the concerns that underlie the attempt to regulate 
them . . . .”403 The Supreme Court did not intend to pass judgment on California’s 
concern that violent video games may corrupt the minds of the young; however, 
the Court must respect the government confines when it comes to restricting 
constitutionally protected speech and expression.404   
In closing, Scalia acknowledged that California’s presented interests in “(1) 
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addressing a serious social problem and (2) helping concerned parents control their 
children,” were legitimate.405  The law intended to incorporate these concerns, 
however, was fatally underinclusive and overinclusive.406  As a result, 
“[l]egislation such as this, which is neither fish nor fowl, cannot survive strict 
scrutiny,”407 and therefore, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed.408   
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the final judgment; 
however, their concurrence articulated their disagreement with the Court’s 
treatment of video games as just another form of media, as opposed to an evolving 
new technology.409  Specifically, the concurrence speculated that “[t]here are 
reasons to suspect that the experiences of playing video games just might be very 
different from reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie or 
television show.”410  The concurrence then proceeded to conduct a more in depth 
analysis of the comparison of California’s video game regulation to the statute at 
issue in Ginsberg.411 
As an additional point of contention, the concurrence disagreed with the 
majority’s assessment that Stevens controls.412  The concurrence distinguished the 
present law from that at issue in Stevens by observing that the statutes in Stevens 
prohibited any person from creating, selling, or possessing depictions of animal 
cruelty, while California’s law specifically prohibited the sale of violent video 
games to minors.413  Second, the concurrence stated that Stevens does not support 
the majority’s application of the strict scrutiny standard to the California law.  
Lastly, Alito expressed his disapproval with the majority opinion’s sweeping 
decision, which was unlike that in Stevens where the Court left the door open for a 
later, more narrowly tailored statute to be found constitutional.414  Alito’s 
concurrence expressed the concern that the majority decision will be interpreted as 
indicating that no regulation of a minor’s access to violent video games is ever 
allowed.415  As such, Alito believed that a properly drafted statute framed within 
constitutional requirements may be permitted and thus, the majority failed to leave 
room for this possibility.416  
As for the dissent, Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer authored their own 
separate opinions.  Justice Thomas’ dissent took the view that the majority 
improperly extended the protections of the First Amendment.417  Instead, Justice 
Thomas believed the present case encompasses a new category of speech: “speech 
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to minor children bypassing their parents.”418  Thomas then went on to relate the 
history of parents having authority over what their children are exposed to.419  
Based on Thomas’s historical analysis in which parents exhibited complete 
authority over their children, he concluded that “the Framers could not possibly 
have understood ‘the freedom of speech’ to include an unqualified right to speak to 
minors.”420  Accordingly, a law abridging speech that addresses minors without 
parental consent does not violate the First Amendment.421  In conclusion, Justice 
Thomas reasoned that: 
Where a minor has a parent or guardian . . . the law does not prevent that minor 
from obtaining a violent video game with his parent’s or guardian’s help.  In the 
typical case, the only speech affected is speech that bypasses a minor’s parent or 
guardian.  Because such speech does not fall within the “freedom of speech” as 
originally understood, California’s law does not ordinarily implicate the First 
Amendment and is not facially unconstitutional.422 
Conversely, Justice Breyer believed the California law was constitutional 
and comported with the First Amendment.423  Firstly, Breyer stated that the 
applicable standards of review in determining the constitutionality of California’s 
video game regulation are the vagueness precedents and the strict scrutiny test.424  
The relevant category of speech for this type of review, however, is not depictions 
of violence, but rather is the category of “protection of children.”425 
Under the vagueness analysis, Breyer found the California statute provided 
sufficient notice of what is prohibited under the law, and therefore was not 
impermissibly vague.426  Additionally, California’s law was no more vague than 
New York’s statute in Ginsberg.427  Accordingly, any issues of remaining 
confusion could be cured through the state courts’ interpretation.428  
Breyer then proceeded to apply the standard of strict scrutiny to California’s 
video game regulation, but with the opposite result from the majority.429  To arrive 
at this result, Breyer determined that both California’s interest in addressing a 
social problem and in aiding parental authority are legitimate, and indeed, are 
furthered by the California legislation.430  According to Breyer, the California law 
achieved these aims since it only prevents a minor from buying a violent video 
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game without a parent’s permission.431  Furthermore, video games are accepted 
teaching tools, and therefore, properly regulating the distribution of video games 
deemed exceedingly violent will further California’s aim of protecting the physical 
and psychological well-being of minors.432  Breyer admittedly found the scientific 
studies and reports presented by the State in its argument compelling, unlike the 
majority, in this respect.433  
Because Breyer concluded that the California law passes the first part of the 
strict scrutiny test, he continued his analysis with the application of the second part 
of the test, which is whether there were any less restrictive means that would 
accomplish California’s objectives.434  In his brief analysis on this second part of 
the test, Breyer made the cursory finding that the video game industry’s self-
implemented regulations have failed to achieve the goal of ensuring that minors do 
not have access to mature-rated video games, and therefore, there are no less 
restrictive alternatives.435   
In conclusion, Breyer posited that the majority’s decision creates an anomaly 
in First Amendment law.436  Specifically, Breyer cannot reconcile the majority’s 
ruling in light of the Ginsberg holding, which begs the question, “what sense does 
it make to forbid selling a 13-year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude 
woman, while protecting a sale to that 13-year-old of an interactive video game in 
which he actively, but virtually, binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills 
her?”437   
Breyer concluded his dissent with the opinion that Ginsberg controls the 
outcome of the case and therefore, California’s violent video game regulation was 
constitutional on its face.438  Moreover, Breyer imparted that the present case is 
more about education than censorship.439  As such, the First Amendment does not 
prevent the government from assisting parents with their children’s education 
about matters of violence.440   
VII.  POTENTIAL IMPACT ON VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY 
Although the Supreme Court has affirmed that California’s regulation on the 
distribution of violent video games is unconstitutional, it is still productive to 
explore the potential impact a constitutional regulation would have on the business 
of the video game industry.  
While it is difficult to predict the effects of enforcing such a violent video 
game regulation without being flooded by dramatic claims that the video game 
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industry would fade into obscurity, there is some truth to the negative impact video 
game regulation would have on the industry and the economy.  If a statute similar 
to California’s law were put into effect, retailers and video game developers would 
be liable for fines of up to $1,000 for each violation.441  Additionally, the law 
provides guidelines for reporting suspected violations to the city or district 
attorney, giving overly protective parents more than enough ammo to bring 
retailers under fire who sell video games that remotely portray some form of 
“violence.”442  Thus, there is little exaggeration to the conclusion that the creation 
of M-rated games would decrease substantially since retailers would not want to 
risk the liability of selling such games illegally to minors.  This unwillingness to 
distribute such M-rated games would create a domino effect reaching not only 
game publishers, who will not produce games that could not be sold, but also 
developers, who actually design and create video games.  Although, the majority 
of the video game industry’s revenue comes from the sale of E-rated games,443 half 
of the top-selling games for 2010 were M-rated games.444  Thus, a regulation 
imposing penalties for distributing such games to minors would inevitably drive 
video game developers away from producing games that could incur a fine.445   
Additionally, legal minded experts predict that original titles, i.e. games 
owned by publishers with established franchises including Call of Duty and Grand 
Theft Auto, would be affected first. 446  This would take place in the form of 
modifying existing original titles in order to avoid the risk for penalties and to 
avoid publishing an “unproven commodity” that could be deemed too violent.447  
In addition, the brunt of the risk will be put on smaller, independent developers 
since they produce and publish their own games.448  Thus, if a title does not 
procure revenue, the independent developers will be not be able to afford the costs 
of creating their next project.  As publishers shift the pressure from the retailers to 
developers to create statutorily acceptable games, it is unlikely independent 
developers will survive when it is uncertain whether their titles will be distributed, 
drastically affecting sales.449  Thus, it is likely more development projects will 
move away from independent studios who cannot afford to take risks with creating 
a game that may fail to be published.450  
In light of the uncertainty with which such legislation would be applied, 
production of games would most likely take longer to reach completion in order 
                                                          
441 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.3 (West 2011). 
442 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.4 (West 2011). 
443 See Reeves, supra note 57, at 23. 
444 See Reilly, supra note 61. 
445 See Patrick Sweeny, The Slippery Slope: Practical Implications if California Assembly Bill No. 





448 As opposed to other developers that are paid up front by the publishing company and, therefore, 
receive payment on a title regardless of how it sells.  
449 Id. 
450 See id.  
2011 VIOLENT VIDEO GAME REGULATION 131 
 
for developers to carefully traverse the murky waters of what constitutes a 
regulated violent video game.  Or, games will continue to be produced on time; 
however, the detail and precision with which games are normally produced will 
decline out of an abundance of caution by developers, resulting in generic and 
unoriginal video game content.  Thus, content and creativity alike would suffer. 
There is genuine concern among video game consumers, dubbed “gamers,” 
that any regulation on the sale of video games will affect the games they’ve come 
to know and love.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, Ronald Williams, an 
avid gamer who has been playing video games since he was three-years-old, 
voiced his concern that “if [the law] were to pass, it would severely limit what 
developers produce and make, on top of a lot of revenue being lost.”451  Williams 
expressed his fear that “the future game experience will change,” and that there 
will be a “[s]carlet letter on any [game] above a Teen [ESRB] rating.”452  
Moreover, Williams stated, “this isn’t the end of the regulation of video game 
content,” a topic which he feels strongly about.453  As a consumer, Williams feels 
he’s virtually powerless to stop the state from generating legislation that threatens 
to erode his favorite hobby.454 
The courts have also recognized this “chilling effect” on creativity.  In 
Blagojevich, the district court quoted Ted Price, the President and CEO of 
Insomniac Games, as saying that, “creators will be unable to determine what is 
regulated, forcing them to eliminate anything in their games that resembles 
violence.”455  As an example Price expressed his would-be reluctance to include 
even cartoon violence in his games.456  Furthermore, courts have recognized that 
laws regulating the distribution of violent video games will place the burden on 
retailers, who “would likely steer clear of any game with the potential of such 
violence in order to avoid civil and criminal liability, thus denying constitutionally 
protected free speech to minors and adults.”457  
With severe limitations in place, it is likely that consumers, publishers, and 
developers will turn to the Internet for “hard-core” games, as least initially.458  The 
access to downloadable content, however, will only be uninhibited for so long, as 
legislation similar to that regulating retail sales will be drafted for distribution of 
downloadable content.459  If such legislation were enacted to regulate the internet, 
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there is no question that the limitations on video developers would begin to 
infringe on individual freedoms of creative expression as well.  User-generated 
conduct,460 while currently less expansive than originally predicted, is still a 
significant contributor to video game content.  There are top-ten lists for user-
generated games and iPhone or iPad applications,461 revealing how pervasive some 
user-generated content can be.  If legislation regulating online video game content 
is enacted to follow suit with California’s video game regulation, user-generated 
content will inevitably become an area of conflict as individuals will be subject to 
tailoring their own creative expressions.  Thus, there is potential for video game 
regulation to threaten personal First Amendment freedoms in a very serious way.  
In recognizing the economic hit that the video game industry will inevitably 
take if California’s statute is upheld as constitutional, there will also be a ripple 
effect on employment.  California is the largest employer of game software 
personnel, comprising approximately 41% of the total number of U.S. workers in 
the video game publishing industry.462  The decrease in video game revenue that 
would likely result, should California’s statute be enforced, would lead to loss of 
jobs in California’s already depressed job market.463  Additionally, in 2009, the 
value that the entertainment software industry added to the United States’ gross 
domestic product was $4.95 billion.464  Thus, on a larger scale, decreases in the 
earnings of the video game industry will negatively impact the contributions to the 
United States economy.465 
Lastly, the passage of any future regulation regarding the distribution of 
violent video games would most likely trigger the enactment of similar legislation 
across the country.  Thus, the economic and creative impact felt locally would 
spread across the country. 
Despite the outcome in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, there is no 
guarantee that such a decision is a “clear-cut win.”466  In light of the Court’s 
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decision that there may some day be a constitutional law regulating video game 
distribution, state legislatures may continue to test the boundaries with new statutes 
and laws aimed at fitting within the constitutional confines set by the Supreme 
Court.  Only time will tell.467 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Throughout history, society has repeatedly cried “wolf” whenever a new 
form of media emerges.  While the initial panic often results in strict regulations on 
the distribution and creation of such media, inevitably it becomes apparent that 
there is no “wolf” to be afraid of.  Most recently, the “wolf” has taken the form of 
violent video games; however, the Supreme Court has held that California’s cry is 
nothing more than a false alarm.  Although such a decision was expected and the 
Supreme Court has firmly established that new categories of unprotected speech 
cannot be added to the existing categories of obscenity, fighting words, and 
incitement, there is no guarantee that the cry of “wolf” will be silenced for long.  
While the decision marks a definitive victory for the video game and entertainment 
industries, video games are simply the latest medium to cause society concern, and 
it is unlikely that they will be the last. 
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